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This thesis examines the anatomy of postwar Japanese economic development. It is
illustrated by the reform and reconstruction era (1945-52) and those factors which caused
the Japanese economy to grow during the 1953-73 period. Furthermore, on the basis of
Japanese economic successes, the role of the Japanese in world affairs again became
important. However, due to the world experiencing economic inflation and an oil shock
after 1974, the Japanese economy also experienced slower growth. Discussed in detail are
those factors that made the Japanese economy slow down in this period. This thesis
stresses the three decades of Japanese economic development after World War II.
Evaluation of the Japanese economy is necessary to analyze its weaknesses and strengths
which will shape its future development and competitiveness.
In particular, the end of Cold War brought new kinds of thinking and concern
about what type of problems Japan might face in the next century. Of course those issues
include regionalism, economic strategy shifts after the end of Cold War, and intricate
major power relations among Japan, China and the United States. In reality the post-Cold
War challenges are also a turning point for Japan compelling it to deal with new problems
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This thesis addresses postwar Japanese economic development. To assess the
anatomy of Japan's economy, I will review the prewar Japanese economy in order to
further analyze the postwar Japanese economy. First of all, Japan poured all its resources
into the war since the outbreak ofwar with China. The best labor was conscripted into the
military service to develop its armament industry. The Japanese military staged a coup on
February 26, 1936 and by the end ofWorld War II almost brought about Japan's collapse.
Japanese international payments already were on the verge of bankruptcy, and a large
number of people were on the brink of starvation. In addition, after the American atomic
bombing the country can be described as in the trash can. Against this background my
motivation is to study how the postwar Japanese economic recovery and reconstruction
produced a modern country in just three decades after World War II.
From 1947-52, during the Occupation period, Japan with support from the United
States adopted a series of reforms that made the coming two decades an economic
success. Those reforms included the breakup of the Zaibatsu, land reform, and labor
democratization, and constructing and stabilizing the postwar economy under the
Occupation authority's guidance. In order to push forward its development the Japanese
government also played an active role to support corporate reconstruction to make their
operations normal. Furthermore, it set up reconstruction bank funds for financial and
industrial rehabilitation, and set up emergency financial measures to reduce inflation. I also
will point out that - with the assistance of the United States - Japan ended the Occupation
faster than was imagined at first.
xv
Furthermore, in this thesis I also examine which factors made the rapid growth
possible during the 1953-73 period. The internal factors consisted of aggressive behavior
by firms, advances in technology, the labor force, capital stock, and government policies.
The external factors were the role ofKorean War and the establishment of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). After two decades of economic growth the Japanese
economy also faced problems created by the worldwide recession and oil shock. Here I
will examine what factors caused the Japanese economic growth slow down. Those
factors can be summarized as follows, slow capital formation, ending the technological
catch-up, high energy costs, diversification of social goals, sluggish world economic
development, a changing labor market, and slower productivity growth.
After inspecting the processes ofJapanese economic development after World War
II, I will evaluate the Japanese economy in several fields including the appreciation ofthe
Japanese Yen, strengths of the Japanese economy, weaknesses of the Japanese economy,
and then I shall make a brief summary. As the collapse of Soviet power ended the global
bilateral confrontation, the transformation ofthe Japanese role in the world became more
important. By the end of Cold War, Japan had become an economic power surpassing any
European country in economic authority and rivaling the United States for economic
influence. As one of the economic leaders of a changing world, Japan was seriously
concerned about the emergence of regionalism, restructuring the triangular relationship
with China and United States, and seeking its new role in the post-Cold War era in order
to protect Japanese interests either regionally or internationally.
xvi
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From the outbreak of the war with China on July 7 in 1937 to the Japanese defeat
in August 1945, Japan poured all its resources into the war. Direct economic controls
were seriously imposed by Tokyo at the beginning of the war in China. Supporting this
tendency in the industrial structure it was necessary to swell the military production
sector, and the subsistence commodities sector was squeezed to the utmost in order to
conquer China (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1973).
Therefore, the best labor power was conscripted into the military service to
develop its armament industry. Based on its superior technology at the beginning of the
war Japan got a great deal of benefit from China. However, as the war proceeded, the
economic situation became worse. By the end of the war it almost brought about Japan's
collapse. When talking about the Japanese postwar economy first we need to go over the
prewar influence of the Army, as we know the Japanese military took over by a coup on
February 26, 1936. Since the Japanese military assumed power, in the government no one
was strong enough to disagree with, or stand against, the Army. The Army tried to
complete its Five-year Plan for key industries, which gave priority to basic industries such
as steel, coal, and synthetic petroleum. The puppet cabinet had no other choice under the
inhuman requests of the Army's Production Capacity Expansion Plan.
Under these circumstances, Japanese international payments already were on the
verge of bankruptcy. The situation worsened year by year. By the time of its defeat large
numbers of people were on the brink of starvation. Securing the most minimal food supply
for the population had become a more urgent issue for the government than the military's
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production. In 1945 most of the major cities of Japan had collapsed and its power to
prevent the Allies from landing was nearly incapable of resisting.
In August 1945 the Japanese Emperor announced an unconditional surrender after
the American atomic bombs. At that moment the country can be described as in the ash
can. This situation was an obvious contrast to modern Japan. This also led to my
motivation to study the successful story of the Japanese postwar economy.
The beginning ofthe postwar crippled situation may be summarized as follows.
First, the population of those who died in the battles or from disease contracted at the
front lines is estimated at 1.65 million for the Army, including 27,000 civilians in military
service, and 470,000 for the Navy. There were 300,000 who died during the air raids, and
90,000 civilians who died in the battle for Okinawa. Altogether the casualties added up to
more than 2.5 million, including the wounded and missing. If the total number included the
internees in Siberia and colonists in Manchuria it would reach 3 million. On the other
hand, the material losses was up to 64.3 billion Japanese yen. These losses amounted to a
quarter of the remaining national wealth of 188.9 billion Japanese yen. This amount was
nearly equal to the total value of Japan's national wealth in 1935. Thus, the national
strength of the ten years from 1935 to 1945 was wiped out at a stroke (Nakamura, 1995,
pp. 15-16).
Fortunately, some legacies ofwar were conducive to the postwar Japanese
economic development. They will be stated as follows. The engineers who possessed a
mastery of their technologies could shift their skills to new fields since the policy changed.
For example, factories that produced machine guns turned to making sewing machines;
optical weapons factories began making cameras and binoculars. Thus the facilities,
technologies, and skills acquired during the war exerted a huge influence on the
subsequent direction ofthe economy (Nakamura 1995, pp. 17-18). Furthermore, the
emergence of the subcontracting system, which spread so widely in the postwar era, was
also a war time distinguished phenomenon.
Additionally, the "System of Financial Institutions Authorized to Finance
Munitions Companies" formerly backed the authorized institutions so they would not lack
funds. In the postwar reconstruction period these relationships were to reappear and
become entrenched in the form of the powerful financial groupings known as Keiretsu.
The Keiretsu were composed of not only the industrial combines (Zaibatsu) like Mitsui
and Mitsubishi, but also of major banks like the Industrial Bank of Japan, Fuji, Sanwa, and
Dai-ichi Kangyo (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 18). They were all formed during this period.
Besides those factors, the strong administrative leadership which the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Transportation came to
exercise over industry can also be dated back to the wartime Commerce and Industry
Ministry's and Munitions Ministry's experience with control which was transformed during
the postwar period. The characteristics of postwar labor-management relations can also be
found in the war time era (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 19). And the seniority wage system, the
lifetime employment system, and health insurance system developed into the postwar
social system as prominent factors to stabilize the Japanese postwar economy.
The establishment of the Food Administration System in 1941 also played a crucial
role to stabilize the rice price and increase its production. Simultaneously, it guaranteed
the transition of land reform going smoothly after the war. All those legacies changed a
large proportion of the Japanese people's life style customs, technologies, social and
economic systems. This change contributed directly to the Japanese postwar economy.
Following the defeat the Japanese economy faced a lot of staggering problems.
When the military forces were demobilized the number of troops reached to 7 million; the
collapse of military-related production laid off about 4 million people; and about 1.5
million people were repatriated from abroad. This brought the jobless total to about 13.1
million (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 23). Faced with the desperate economic conditions of the
early postwar years, it also encouraged centralized planning for the economy, which gave
the Japanese government a greater capacity to guide industry than most other countries
have ever had, including those that boast a fully planned economy
(Reischauer, 1990, pp. 226).
The next concerns were the grave shortages of energy and food. Japan's major
energy was based on coal and hydroelectric power. Due to the defeat the laborers who
were from Korea and China refused to continue to work in coal mines, therefore the
volume of production dropped from 3 to 4 million tons to barely a million monthly. The
food issue was important at that time. The rice crop was only one third of average annual
output in 1945 (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 24). Concerned about the starving people, the
Japanese government asked the Occupation Army for help.
Because of unemployment, and a shortage of food and energy, inflation was
unavoidable and gradually became a serious problem in the postwar Japanese society. In
order to alleviate the people's unrest during the wartime air raid period the government
released funds onto the market. Besides, directly after the defeat a large volume of funds
for provisional military expenses flowed into circulation from the salaries of demobilized
troops, payments for completed orders of military goods, advance payments,
compensation for losses, and so on. As a result, a rapid inflation developed (Nakamura,
1995, pp. 24). This adverse effect from the war was a tough challenge to the postwar
Japanese government. Fortunately, the American policy was stern but constructive. It was
based on the realization that a program of revenge and retribution would breed lasting
hatred and unrest and that only through enlightened reform was Japan likely to change
from a disturber to a supporter ofworld peace (Reischauer, 1990, pp. 189).
In my thesis Chapter II, I will examine the reform and reconstruction, and how the
Japanese made their economic democratization through several processes. These include
the break up of the Zaibatsu, land reform and labor democratization, and reconstructing
and stabilizing the postwar economy under the Occupation authority's guidance. To push
forward development the government played an active role to support corporate
reconstruction to make their operations normal. Furthermore, it set up reconstruction
bank funds for financial and industrial rehabilitation, and adopted Emergency Financial and
Economic Measures to reduce inflation. Regarding the United States' contributions, I also
will point out that with the assistance of the United States - Japan ended the Occupation
faster than was imagined at first.
In Chapter III, the rapid economic growth period, I will focus on two areas. First,
I will analyze the domestic conditions that made the Japanese economy succeed through
several factors. Those factors include aggressive behavior by firms, advances in
technology, the labor force, capital stock, and government policies. Next, I would like to
point out the external factors that pushed the Japanese economy forward. Those factors
include the establishment of the IMF in 1944, and the role ofthe Korean War.
In Chapter IV, I will view what factors caused the Japanese economic growth
slowdown. Those factors can be summarized as follows, slow capital formation, end of
technological catch-up, high energy costs, diversification of social goals, sluggish world
economic development, a changing labor market, and slower productivity growth.
In Chapter V, I will evaluate the Japanese economy within several fields which
include appreciation of the Japanese yen, strengths of the Japanese economy, weaknesses
of the Japanese economy, and I will make a short summary of its economy.
In Chapter VI, Japan in the post-Cold War era, I will assess the emergence of
regionalism and the Japanese global economic view. I will emphasize certain areas,
including the European Community (EC), North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Those regionalisms may
cause a great concern for Japanese global economic interests. At the same time I shall
assess its new role in the international community. Second, I will examine the Japanese
shift of capital to the Asian countries, emphasizing Japan as a capital supplier, a
technology provider, or as an absorber of the regional product. Third, because the world
situation changed since the Soviet Union collapsed, the relations among Japan, China, and
U.S. became crucial and intricate. I will examine Japan's role among them. Finally, I will
predict that Japan is seeking a global role through joining the UN-PKO, and becoming a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. If those two wishes come true, I will
examine what Japan will do? Will it be merely an economic power or will it go beyond
that limit to become a superpower?
In Chapter VII, Conclusion, I will make some final comments.

II. REFORM AND RECONSTRUCTION
The Japanese economy recovered from wearing rags after World War II. There
were many factors to denote its development. Different schools had different typologies.
No matter what viewpoints were used, they saw Japanese economic development. Two
fundamental factors played a critical role in the Japanese postwar economic development.
One was economic democratization which included the breakup the Zaibatsu, land reform,
and labor democratization. Another was the reconstruction and stabilization.
A. ECONOMIC DEMOCRATIZATION
Soon after General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Japan as head of the Allied
Occupation Force, he introduced several measures aimed at democratizing Japan
politically and economically. Three major reforms imposed during the Occupation - the
break up of the Zaibatsu, land reform, and labor democratization affected the post
Japanese economy significantly and are credited with promoting a higher rate of economic
growth (Ito, 1993, pp. 54).
1. The Breakup of the Zaibatsu
There were four main reasons for the growth of Japan's Zaibatsu. First, they had
large initial capital resources. Second, the holding company system itself gave them ready
access to financial resources (banks), raw materials (mines), and direct lines for foreign
trade. Third, they were led by able individuals who were entrepreneurs and who actively
secured new managerial talent. Fourth, they were family-based organizations that applied
the concept of the household to the new business environment (Setsuko, Suzuki, ed., pp.
136). Based on those reasons the Zaibatsu formed a strong basis for cohesion of the
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Japanese economy. On the other hand, the Japanese economy also was under the control
of a few great financial and industrial combines (Zaibatsu).
Following World War II the Zaibatsu were dissolved by Occupation authorities. Its
purpose was to destroy the military power both psychologically and institutionally.
Moreover, Japan's industries had been under the control of Zaibatsu and enjoying much
more advantageous treatment from the Japanese government. To control the Zaibatsu
promoted the end of a semi-feudal relationship, helped the development of labor unions
and wages, elevated the creation of firms by independent entrepreneurs, and helped assure
the rise of the middle class would take place gradually.
Whether or not the Zaibatsu can be said to have been the advance guard of
imperialism is also problematic. The principal source ofgreat wealth ofMitsui and
Mitsubishi was trade. They were affiliated with overseas firms and hoped for cooperation
with England and America. However, it is also true that the Zaibatsu exerted their
privileged powers to control the Japanese economy. Thus it is not surprising that
American economists in the 1930s focuded on the Zaibatsu as the source of evil
(Nakamura,1995, pp. 26). Under the Occupation era there were some measures to
dissolve the Zaibatsu.
a. Breakup the Holding Companies
The prewar Zaibatsu were groups of large companies across different
industries controlled by family-owned holding companies. At the end of the war, major
Zaibatsu groups held about 40 percent of equity (paid-in capital). The Occupation force
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required the auctioning off the shares owned by their holding companies (Ito, 1993, pp.
54).
Thus, the first steps in the dissolution of the Zaibatsu was to break up the
holding companies, which were the core of Zaibatsu control, and to sell their stock to the
public. The holding companies possessed 167 million of shares in 1946, having a value of
8.1 billion Japanese yen. Since the total number of shares in all companies in the country
was 443 million, this meant that the holding companies owned all but 40 percent of the
total. As a result of a series of dissolution measures, 165 million shares, valued at 7.57
billion Japanese yen, had been settled by 1951. The Zaibatsu leaders, included members
active in the financial world. The unrelenting nature of the Zaibatsu dissolution, even to
the extent of taking measures against founding family members, was contrary to the
general principles of a modern democratic society (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 26).
b. Set up the laws
In 1947 the Occupation force introduced a measure (called the Elimination
ofExcessive Concentration ofEconomic Power) intend to break up monopolistic
companies. To maintain competition they also introduced the Anti-Monopoly Law (Ito,
1993, pp. 54). Even though this legislation was in practice very leniently applied, Table 1
shows that, with the exception of such firms as those in textiles, where there were many
consolidations during the war, and highly oligopolistic aluminum and beer industries, the
concentration ratios for the top three producers and top ten producers in most industries
were lower after the war than they had been prior to it - particularly those for the top three
producers. Once again the stock held by large corporations in affiliated companies was
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sold to the public and controlling relations were severed. These measures set the stage for
the fierce competition which was characteristic of postwar industry in Japan. The plant
and equipment expansions and technological advances increased the pressure of
competition and made the economic growth greater (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 27).
Those policies exerted great influence over the entire postwar economy. It
was an economy characterized by intense competition in all industries. There were some
industries, such as steel and automobiles, in which the nature of the industry led to
competition among a handful of oligopolistic firms, and others, like textiles, in which a
large number of firms competed, but the basic trend after the war was toward a dead heat
in a field of little guys, with no Gullivers in the race. This produced good market
mechanisms and was a powerful factor in economic growth. Therein lay the effectiveness
of the deconcentration law - good examples of the kind of economic policies whose results
were startling to those who drafted them. Furthermore, those policies made many markets
more competitive, promoted vigorous investment demand, and enhanced consumer
welfare (Ito, 1993, pp. 54).
2. Land Reform
In 1945, Kenzo Matsumura, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Shidehara
Cabinet, proposed a reform plan: (1) To change the tenant's rent payment in kind to
payment in money. (2) To strengthen measures to increase land-owning, self-cultivating
farmers. (3) To democratize the organization of the Agricultural Land Committees in each
region (Tsuru, 1993, pp. 20).
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Table 1 . Concentration Ratios for Leading Producers
1937, 1950, 1962,
Top3 & Top 10 firms Top3 & Top 10 firms Top3 & Top 10 firms
Pig iron 97.8 - 88.7 93.0 27.7 38.4
Ferro-alloys 51.2 60.0 48.8 81.2 34.6 69.3
Hot rolled steel 56.2 81.3 49.6 77.1 49.8 78.9
Galvanized iron sheet 19.9 85.5 32.8 70.3 37.6 73.6
Electric-furnace steel 74.9 100.0 73.4 100.0 65.3 100.0
Aluminum 91.8 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 -
Bearings 100.0 - 76.3 95.4 68.7 92.6
Steel ships 67.5 96.7 39.1 94.1 37.7 75.5








Caustic soda 55.1 86.5 33.8 71.1 23.5 59.8
Synthetic dyes 56.3 70.1 75.2 92.7 64.8 88.8
Sheet celluloid 77.7 91.2 69.2 89.2 80.6 95.0
Rayon filament 36.5 76.1 70.8 100.0 60.5 100.0
Cotton yarn 33.9 59.1 35.1 88.1 16.6 48.2
Cotton textiles 16.5 30.6 18.6 44.2 6.6 17.2
Pulp 65.2 85.3 39.5 73.0 30.5 60.6
Paper 83.1 99.3 57.0 80.3 39.9 65.9
Soy sauce 20.1 28.2 16.7 23.7 25.3 30.3
Cement 40.1 78.5 55.9 91.3 47.1 82.0
Coal 35.4 60.6 35.9 59.6 31.0 55.8
Foreign trade* 35.1 51.7 13.0 30.5 24.8 50.5
Banking 25.8 61.1 21.8 59.6 19.9 54.5
Marine transport 29.8 46.8 18.1 33.1 22.8 56.6
Life insurance 41.4 81.6 47.2 83.7 43.5 85.1
Warehousing 37.8 61.4 25.2 37.4 20.6 31.2
* Prewar figures for foreign trade are average for the years 1937-43, while postwar figure shown are for
1951 and 1957 instead of for 1960 and 1962.
Sorurce: From Fair Trade Commission, Nihon no Sangyo Shuchu (Japan's Industrial Concentration), Data
Table 1
On the other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry also submitted to the
Diet a draft of a land reform program which would have allowed landlords to retain 5 cho
(1 cho =2.45 acres) of land and obligated them to transfer anything above that amount to
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the cultivators. But while this bill was being debated, the Occupation forces issued a
memorandum on land reform and the bill, though passed by the Diet, was never
implemented. Eventually, a second draft was prepared under the direction ofGHQ, and its
content was far more severe than the Agriculture Ministry's proposal. The program which
was agreed upon after discussions between the occupation authorities and Japanese
officials was a thorough-going reform stipulating that all the land of absentee landlords,
and all but one cho (approximately one hectare) ofthe land belonging to landlords residing
in the rural villages, would be bought up by the government for redistribution to the tenant
farmers (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 28-29).
Of all the reform programs that followed World War II, the land reform of 1946
was perhaps the most successful in bringing about basic and whole scope changes in
Japan. A sweeping redistribution of land largely eliminated tenancy by 1949 and resulted
in about 90 percent of cultivated land being farmed by owners. The results of land reform
are shown in Table 2. The proportion of total agricultural land area worked by tenant
farmers was reduced from nearly 50 percent to about 10 percent. The diminishment was
particularly notable in the Tohoku region and in Hokkaido. Also important is the fact that
this stringent reform had the effect of rapidly increasing the productive capacity of
rice-growing land in such areas as Hokkaido, Tokoku, and Tozan- generally the northeast
portion of Japan - where large landlords had been especially powerful (see Table 3). After
the transfer of property rights, land improvements were carried out on a large scale and
combined with the introduction of new rice-growing technology to raise the level of
agricultural productivity (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 29).
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In addition, the increasingly prosperous countryside was able simultaneously to
help expand the postwar domestic consumer market, which played such an important part
in Japan's economic miracle. The Occupation land reform was a key achievement of the
period. It assured the tranquillity of the countryside for decades to come (Cohen, 1987,
pp. 178).
Table 2. Changes in the Proportion of Tenant Farmers
Proportion of total worked by
Total farmland area tenant farmers a
Region 1000 Cho* Novermber 1946 August 1
Hokkaido 726 48.7 6.7
Tohoku 813 48.2 8.4
Kanto 874 50.6 12.5
Hokuriku 426 49 9.1
Tozan 298 43.4 10.3
Tokai 343 50.5 12.4
Kinki 352 44.9 13.6
Chugoku 398 40.3 10.2
Shikoku 220 43.5 10
Kyushu 706 41 10.3





* 1 Cho=2.54 acres
Source: Kayo Nobufumi, Nihon Nogyo Tokei (Basic Statistics on Japanese Agiculture)
(Norin Suisangyo Seisansei Kojo Kaigi,1958)
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Hokkaido 74 32 Osaka -11 -10
Aomori 57 27 Shizuoka -10 -13
Iwate 31 22 Nara -11 3
Akita 29 11 Hiroshima -10 -10
Yamagata 28 10 Kochi -8 7
Miyagi 27 15 Wakayama -7 -7
Fukushima 26 10 Aichi -6 10
Nigata 23 5 Hyogo . -6 -1
Nagano 19 6 Kagawa -4 6
Kagoshima 15 21 Yamanashi -3 -11
* 1 tan=.245 acres
Source: Same as for Table2
3. Labor Democratization
Japanese labor unions had a half-century of history, from their beginnings in the
rikisha men's strike of 1883 and the organization ofthe Shueisha printers' Union in 1884
to their forced dissolution and replacement in 1938 by a completely
government-controlled labor front (Sampo-Roho) modeled after the Nazi patriotic Labor
Front. They reached their prewar high point in 1936 with 420,000 members. Although that
1936 figure meant only 7 percent of the nonagricultural work force (10 percent, if only
men are included) was organized, the situation was not much different from that of the
United States (Cohen, 1987, pp. 191).
The occupation force also encouraged the organization of labor unions. Standards
for the working environment and for compensation were established in the Labor
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Relations Adjustment Act of 1946 and the Labor Standards Law of 1947, respectively. As
a result of these changes, labor unions spread quickly in every sector of the Japanese
economy. The percentage of unionized workers jumped from 3.2 percent in 1945 to 41.5
percent in 1946, and then to 53.0 percent in 1948. In the midst of three-digit inflation and
food shortages, unions and management clashed often. The labor unions planned a general
strike for February 1, 1947; the occupation force, seeing that the labor movement was not
moving along the course envisioned for it, banned that strike. Even after the occupation
force withdrew its active support for labor unions, the number of strikes and
labor-management conflicts continued to increase. In 1948 there were 913 strikes,
involving more than 2.6 million workers. It was not until the 1960s that the cooperative
labor-management relationship often cited in Japanese management literature emerged
nationwide (Ito, 1993, pp. 55).
During this process, Japan's union movement was growing strong roots and
making rapid gains. The unrest at its center notwithstanding, the movement played an
important role in improving working conditions. Early improvements in real wages were
spectacular (see Figure 1), and such results could not have been dreamed of without labor
union bargaining power. About this time the unions began to insist on improved working
conditions in return for vows of loyalty to the company and compelled management to
accept the life time employment system with its restrictions on dismissing employees. Such
policies gained management's tacit approval in the face of repeated strikes for better
working conditions and in opposition to firings and rationalization drives in the 1950s. For
example, the coal miner's strike, the Nissan, Amagasaki Steel, and Oji Paper strikes, and
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fiercest of all, the Mitsui Miike strike. Whichever side was the technical winner, if a strike
were prolonged it would ultimately drive the company into bankruptcy, which meant that
both management and labor were losers. As both sides wanted to avoid such an outcome,
the Japanese style of labor - management relations became entranched, with lifetime
employment, the seniority wage systems, and unions organized by each enterprise as its
three main tenets. The union's practice of channeling their energies almost exclusively into
















lost per union member
Estimated proportion of
work force unionized








1945 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61- 63
Figure I. Impact of labor democratization, 1945-64
1) Estimated proportion of work force unionized no. of unionmembers/no. ofemployees
2) Number of workdays lost per union member= no. of workdays lost due to strikes/no. of union
members
Source: Ministry of Labor, Sengo Rodo Keizaishi (History of the Postwar Labor Economy), data
section.
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From the macroeconomics point of view, the improved conditions, particularly the
higher wages, achieved by the labor unions expanded domestic consumption markets and,
in combination with increased farm incomes, made a great contribution to the
development of the economy. Although the managers individually chafed at them, the
wage increases were highly significant for the economy itself, preparing the way for
subsequent growth. In addition to the above three major reforms, General Headquarters
also imposed a variety of other changes on the Japanese economic system. For example,
the purge of business leaders hastened the succession ofyoung managers to senior
positions. The accumulated effects of all these changes became the foundation of the
present day Japanese economy (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 32).
B. RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION
At the time of Japan's defeat, the Allies took the position that they bore no
responsibility for the reconstruction for the Japanese economy. That job was incumbent
upon the Japanese people themselves. During that period the Japanese not only were to
deal with the domestic problems but also were faced with the exaction of reparations by
the Allies. The Pauley Reparations Mission that came to Japan in the autumn of 1945
proposed a stern program (see Table 4). All the aircraft, light metal, and arsenals were
removed, along with about half of the equipment in shipbuilding yards, steam-powered
electric generating plants, and steel production capacity would be reduced to 2.5 million
tons. Japan's industrial level would be setback to the level of 1926-30 (Nakamura, 1995,
pp. 33).
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Table 4. Changes in Reparations Proposals: Value of Facilities to be Removed
(Japanese Yen, 1939 prices)
Industry Military Total
Facilities facilities
Nov. 1946 Pauley Report 990 1,476 2,466
March 1948 Strike report 172 1,476 1,648
April 1948 Johnstone (Draper) 102 560 662
Report
Source: article by Hayashi Yujiro in Ekonomisuto,
April 15,1955, p. 72 Cited in Hayashi Yujiro and Miyazaki Isamu,
Nihon no Keizai Keikaku (Japan's Economic Plans)(Toyo Keizai Shimposha,1957), p. 38.
From 1946 to 1948 the Japanese government was trying to achieve two opposing
goals: accelerating the recovery of productive capacity in major industries and taming
inflation. On the inflation front, the government tried direct controls on prices and
resource allocations. To rebuild productive capacity, the government pursued more
traditional forms of fiscal and monetary policies. Furthermore, the Japanese government
directly planned the growth of the coal and steel industries. Its plan called for reallocating
domestically produced coal and imported coal preferentially to the steel industry, and
domestically produced steel to the coal industry. The priority production was very
socialistic. The government also froze many consumer prices and rationed necessities such
asrice(Ito, 1993, pp. 58).
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies were adopted. The Reconstruction
Bank, established in January 1947, became the primary machine for fiscal stimulation. The
Reconstruction Bank issued bond and used the proceeds to subsidize key industries such
as coal, fertilizers, electric power, and iron and machinery. The subsidies were used to
keep the producer prices higher than the consumer prices. The Reconstruction Bank also
made loans to public corporations (Ito, 1993, pp. 58).
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At the same time, the rehabilitation of industry via the priority production system
brought about an expansion of the Reconstruction Bank's funds supply pipeline. Although
the aim was to increase production, the immediate result was to accelerate inflation. The
supply ofgoods was increased by the expanded production, but until supply and demand
equilibrium was established, the money supply overhang stimulated price, which were then
repressed by the Emergency Financial Measures. The consumer price index (including the
black market) soared about 40 percent every three months in 1947, and even heading into
1948 it still continued to rise at a stiff 15 percent quarterly (see Figure 2). It was not
solved until 1949. Luckily, as production began to increase in the latter half of 1948,
inflation had waned considerably (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 35-36).
Figure 2. The Consumer Price Index and its rates of increase, 1946-52 (1960=100)
1) This index includes black market prices
Source: Statistics Bureau, Office of the Prime Minister, Consumer Price Index.
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The black market was a major problem in the years right after the defeat. The ratio
of black market to official prices was as high as 7.2 in 1946, and 5.3 in 1947. Even after
the enactment of the Emergency Financial Measures, the new yen issue accumulated in the
farm villages or in the pockets of black market traders, since people's highest priority was
obtaining food. Eliminating the black market economy, conquering inflation, and reviving
production were major tasks confronting the Katayama Cabinet, which was formed by a
coalition of the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party in the May of 1947 (Nakamura,
1995, pp. 36).
The Emergency Economic Measures this Cabinet adopted in July of 1947 were a
wide-ranging, comprehensive set of prices which, in conjunction with the revival of
production via the priority production system, aimed at revising the official price structure
and containing inflation. The official prices of basic materials (the so-called stabilization
goods-steel, coal, fertilizer, soda, gas, electric power, etc.) in particular were held below
production costs, and the government was to provide price-difference subsidies to make
up for the resulting deficits. In this way, it would be possible to set official prices for other
goods which used these stabilized materials as their raw inputs, and supposedly this would
help to check inflation. The goals of these policies, which assumed that labor productivity
was declining relative to what it had been before the war, were to hold down and stabilize
prices at 65 times, and wages at 28 times, their respective prewar levels. They proposed to
accept a large-scale drop in the real wages and a restore supply and demand equilibrium in
the economy at this low standard of living. Since the salaries of government employees
were set as the standard, the private businesses became helpful (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 37).
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At the time inflation continued unchecked, however. By June of 1948 the official
price structure could no longer be maintained, and a revision had to be carried out. Prices
and wages during this time respectively were at 1 10 and 57 times their prewar levels. Such
was the policy designed to check inflation and revive production. However, when it was
pursued, the fiscal burden imposed by the price-difference subsidies for key materials was
enormous. Moreover, since the subsidy amounts calculated on the basis of June 1947
costs could not catch up with the increases in the prices and wages, deficits in coal mining
and other industries mounted and had to be temporarily covered by loans from such
institutions as the Reconstruction Bank (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 37). (In the end, the
government made up these deficits with grant bonds and saw to it that funds from the
Reconstruction Bank were repaid).
C. THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS DURING THE
OCCUPATION PERIOD
The period of U.S. occupation of Japan was like a guidepost for its future
development. And the most important thing was shaping the Japanese development
policies. The relations between the United States and Japan not only emphasized defense
but also focused on the economic relationship. Under these circumstance Japan gained
benefits from the United States. The American contributions may be listed as follows:
1. Breakup the Monopoly
As early as January 1946 the Corwin Edwards Mission was sent by the United
States to formulate concrete policies for the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. Upon arrival in
Japan, Edwards emphasized in particular that: (1) The aim of Zaibatsu dissolution is
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destroy Japan's militaristic power both psychologically and as a system. (2) To enable
Japanese workers, who had been exploited by the Zaibatsu in the past, to obtain higher
wages and salaries, thus expanding the domestic market (Tsuru, 1993, pp. 19).
The Americans realized that Japan needed a thorough going economic and social
transformation in order to strengthen the foundation for these democratic reforms.
Regarding its economy, there was a significant reform called for in the Initial Post
Surrender Policy, namely the dissolution of the Zaibatsu combines. They were singled out
on the questionable Marxist reasoning that great concentrations of commercial and
industrial wealth were the root source of Japanese militarism and imperialist expansion.
The central holding companies of the Zaibatsu were dissolved. The Zaibatsu families and
their high executives were purged, the bulk of their assets were taken over by government
for future disposal (Reischauer, 1990, pp.194).
The Zaibatsu were dissolved into their various component companies, and at first
it was planned to further break up more than 300 ofthem in an operation reminiscent of
"trust-busting" efforts in the United States. This program proved both difficult and
inadvisable in the face of continuing economic stagnation in Japan and by 1949 was scaled
down to effect less than a score of companies. Because of the failure to break up most of
the component corporations in the Zaibatsu combines, it is frequently asserted that the
Zaibatsu system has been restored in Japan. Fortunately, the integration of Japan's postwar
business and industry is quite different from the prewar system, with the old Zaibatsu
groupings playing only a peripheral role. The Zaibatsu combines may have a closer
relationship with one another than with other companies, but far more important are the
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associations of firms in a certain line of enterprise, such as steel, electric power, or
banking, and the overreaching Federation ofEconomic Organizations, or Keidanren,
which has founded in 1946 and grew to be a major guiding force in the development of big
business and the whole Japanese economy (Reischauer, 1990, pp. 194).
2. Wake the Labor and Peasant's Consciousness
In order to balance the Zaibatsu there was a need to to awaken the industrial labor
and peasantry's political consciousness. Labor legislation was revised to conform to the
most advanced concepts ofEurope and the United States, and veteran Japanese labor
leaders from the twenties, with the active encouragement of the occupation, built up a
rapidly burgeoning and often violently assertive labor movement. By 1949 more than 6.5
million workers had joined labor unions. From the start, the movement started to differ
from that of the United States in that the communists controlled a large share of the
unions for a while and a high percentage of the organized workers were government
employees - teachers, white collar workers in government offices, or laborers in the
national railways or in other nationalized industries. As a result, the occupation authorities
soon discovered, to their distress, that organized labor often showed less interest in
bargaining with management than in political agitation, which seemed to them a more
direct way to affect government wage scales or achieve communist goals (Reischauer,
1990, pp. 194).
3. Assist the Land Redistribution
The most sweeping and successful of all the occupation reforms was aimed at
improving the lot of tenant farmers and awakening their political consciousness. This was
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the land reform program. It was largely carried out between 1947 and 1949.
Tenant-operated farms, which had remained at about 45 percent since early in the century,
were reduced to less than 1 percent by banning all absentee landowners and permitting
the ownership of only a small amount of agricultural land beyond the area cultivated by a
farm family itself. Generous credit terms and a runaway inflation made it easy for the
tenant cultivators to acquire the land and reduced the recompense to the former owners to
only a penny on the dollar in real terms. However socially salutary the results may have
been, this was the kind of reform that could never have been carried through democratic
procedures; external power was necessary. It left the average Japanese farm a mere 2.5
acres in size, which in later more prosperous times was a serious handicap, but it
established a stable, egalitarian, and satisfied farming population, determined to retain its
rights in the new democratic age (Reischauer, 1990, pp. 194-195).
4. Provide a Peaceful and Stable Environment
Under the United States's protection and instruction Japan did not worry about the
external world's problems. At the same time, following those reforms provided Japan with
a stable surroundings to carry out those projects without hesitating. We can say that
without the occupation period under the assistance of the United States, Japan may have
spent a longer time to seek its identity and role. Because the United States and it allies
provided political stability, economic development can follow the track and turn out
successfully.
26
D. END OF THE OCCUPATION
As we know in the beginning of the Occupation era, the United States proposed
some stringent measures. However, in accordance with the changing situation outside of
Japan, the policies shifted. In October of 1948, the Chinese Communist Army tookover
power in China, and the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union
intensified. The Japanese significant role emerged in the coming Cold War. The United
States National Security Council adopted Resolution 13/2 concerning Japan. This
resolution formalized the major turn in American's basic policy toward Japan, removing
many restrictions that had been previously imposed and decreeing that Japanese economic
recovery would be expedited (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 40).
In line with this new policy, the United States not only pursued a more favorable
economic policy in Japan, but also initiated a move to end the Occupation. Initially, the
United States faced objections from its allies, but finally succeeded in convincing them to
come to the peace conference. Under the United States' auspices, the San Francisco Peace
Conference was held in September 1951, and in April of the following year, the
occupation of Japan formally ended. This shift would be to the advantage of rehabilitating




III. THE RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH PERIOD
At the end of the Allied Occupation in 1952, Japan ranked as a less-developed
country, its per capita rate of consumption was merely one-fifth that of the United States.
During the period 1953-73, the economic growth was remarkable. Its average growth was
8.0% per annum overall and 10.6% during the 1960s. This unprecedented growth also
made Japan the first less-developed country in the postwar era to achieve developed status
(Kodansha International Ltd., 1995, pp. 108). However, which factors drove the Japanese
economy forward, and sustained its high growth for two decades (1953-73) is my thesis
concern.
Those factors will be divided into two parts, one deals with the internal factors,
another deals with the external factors. Firstly, the internal factors may be summarized as
follows: 1) aggressive behavior by firms, 2) advances in technology, 3) the labor force, 4)
capital stock, and 5) government policies. Secondly, the external factors entail: 1) the role
ofKorean War, and 2) the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
A. THE INTERNAL FACTORS
1. Aggressive Behavior by Firms
With the boom occasioned by the Korean War, the business firms made an
opportunity from the blow of the Zaibatsu dissolution, the elimination of the concentration
of production in giant companies, the purge of major firms' top management, and the
industrial reorganization, which was forced on them by the postwar "democratization."
Important changes began to take place within the firms themselves at this time (Nakamura,
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1995, pp. 68). There are some characteristics developed in this period. They will be
discussed in detail in the next sections.
a. Acceleration Toward Professional Managers
First of all, there was a complete change of managers. Ever since the Meiji
era the trend had been away from owner-managers toward hired professional managers.
This trend was accelerated by the dramatic changes during and after the war: many ofthe
remaining owner-managers, who were leaders of the zaikai (financial world) were either
purged or lost economic power due to inflation, the burdensome assets tax, and so on.
The obanto (chief managers) of the zaibatsu also lost their positions and were replaced by
a new and much younger generation of ordinary directors, factory or branch managers,
and section chiefs (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 68-69). This new trend made these managers
bear a great responsibility for the postwar Japanese recovery and reconstruction, and
directly influenced the Japanese economic growth.
For example, the Mitsui group of firms had at one time been considered the
property of the Mitsui family and had come to be managed along conservative lines with
emphasis on reality and soundness. Despite the fact that they had been expanding,
profit-making concerns from the first, after the war these companies were streamlined into
an organization of independent firms oriented toward expansion and high profits, and the
young "professional managers" endeavored to achieve these objectives. These men lacked
the dignity and authority of their more conservative predecessors, but they aggressively
took up the challenge of meeting these new goals, and in many cases they succeeded.
Furthermore, when the time came to transfer technology from abroad this also provided
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these aggressive young managers a good opportunity to compete (Nakamura, 1995, pp.
69-70).
b. Developed "Product-Monopoly Busting"
Consideration of production and sales increases, and advancement into new
fields, were planned unceasingly. As a result, a "product-monopoly busting" approach
developed. Among steelmakers this centered on producing special items monopolized by
other companies. Besides fierce competition also developed in the auto industry, where
each firm produced a full line of large, medium, and compact cars to market against its
opponents. In particular in the petrochemical industry, when MITI tried to combine the
smaller companies by announcing that they must have a minimum ethylene production
capacity of 300,000 tons in order to continue to do business, the companies all announced
they would build plants to meet the target, and MITI's efforts ended in failure (Nakamura,
1995, pp. 70).
Therefore the Japanese government's thinking began to change.
Government seemed to intervene less and become more respective to guide the future
development. Trade and direct foreign investment were liberalized, tariff and nontariff
trade barriers were lowered (Dolan and Worden, ed., 1990, pp. 207).
c. Make Profits Based on Bold Business Expansion
Because the firms suffered setbacks during the war, to some extent the
recovery was delayed. Moreover, since the proportion of debentures and borrowed funds
rose and more burdensome interest payments were unavoidable, there was a great
necessity for bold expansion to increase profits. At that time it was strongly asserted that
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improving the equity capital ratio was the key to improving the operating base. However,
if the ratio was improved by using only equtity capital for plant and equipment investment,
rapid expansion would be impossible, profit increses would be limited, and firms would fall
behind other companies in the industry. In the end, firms abandoned the concept of equity
capital ratios and instead expanded plant and equipment investment on the basis of
borrowed funds, debentures, and other debt capital (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 71-72).
Japan has few natural resources and depends on massive imports of raw
materials. It must export to pay for its imports, and manufacturing and the sales of its
services, such as banking and finance, were its principal means of doing so. For these
reasons, the careful development of the producing sector was a key concern ofboth
government and business leaders (Dolan and Worden, 1990, pp. 207). Furthermore, the
government also executed some measures to help the firms, such as cartel formation, tax
reduction or exemption, and industry-wide plant and equipment capacity expansion
agreements. Thus the government's industrial policies functioned as a safety valve so that
firms could boldly pursue aggressive programs within a secure environment. This
aggressive pattern of cooperative behavior was successful, and it was repeated without
suffering a major rupture during this period.
2. Advances in Technology
There is no doubt technology played an important role for the contemporary
Japanese economy. As a matter of fact, a great deal of technology was developed for
military use during World War II. Though the Japanese possessed some advanced
technology, either Japan needed some technologies that they did not have or those
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technologies had been developed a much broader spectrum. For example, electrical
technology and nuclear energy are the best-known. In addition, the technology innovations
such as nylon and continuous rolling equipment in the steel industry, which had been used
in Europe and U.S.before the war, had not yet been introduced into Japan. After about
1950, when the introduction of foreign technology began, this prewar and wartime
technology began to flow into Japan (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 76-77).
In some instances industrial technology was imported in the form of highly
sophisticated machinery. A substantial component of foreign technology has been readily
available in technical and professional journals, in American graduate schools that
Japanese have attained, and similar "costless" sources of information. Much has also come
through technology license arrangements between Japanese and foreign firms. Japanese
firms have been extremely efficient in learning, commercializing, and improving upon
foreign technology. Most Japanese R&D is carried out and financed by private firms, and
much is complementary to the foreign technology they have purchased (Patrick and
Rosovsky, 1976, pp. 20).
In accordance with these efforts technological R&D gave an impetus to the
subsequent economic development. But seeing these developments from another angle,
the application of technology in the heavy and chemical industries caused serious pollution
and damage to the environment as well. This lesson from Japanese economic development
may be a good example to those latecomers.
On the other hand, the Americans also provided the Japanese with useful
technology. Private companies who sold obsolescent technology to Japanese firms at a
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small profit regarded this as an unexpected windfall and never considered that the sharing
of this technology might someday come back to haunt them. In this way the Japanese were
able to narrow the technological gap. With their new industrial plant and their often
superior business organization and marketing techniques, they developed quickly into
formidable economic competitors (Reischauer, pp. 317)
3. The Labor Force
The labor force was one of the most important factors in Japan's economic growth.
It has owned an ample supply of well-trained, well-motivated, hard working labor (Patrick
and Rosovsky, pp. 15). Owing to its successful economy that can simultaneously
reallocate labor away from low-productivity work in agriculture, growth and rising
incomes also allowed for economies of scale in production. Some features of the postwar
labor force are:
a. High Education ofLabor Force
In 1950 Japan had a labor force comparable to that ofWestern Europe in
quality (measured in average years of workers' education). Japan was not far behind the
United States in average years of schooling for males (8.15 versus 9.68 in 1950) and for
females (7.22 versus 10.01) (Denison, 1967, pp. 107). This high educational level is one
reason why the contribution of further increases in education to productivity improvement
is less important in Japan than in many industrialized countries (Patrick and Rosovsky, pp.
15).
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b. Decreased the Labor Force in Low-Productivity Positions
With the economic boom, workers have to move readily into more
productive, higher paying jobs. The aggregate reallocation of labor among different
sectors of the economy has been phenomenal as shown in Table 5. There is a considerably
changed labor structure. The most prominent differences were the new workers entering
sectors and occupations different from those of the older generations, and the high
proportion of the children of farmers who have entered nonagricultural occupations
(Patrick and Rosovsky, 1967, pp. 16). In addition, agriculture accounted for almost 40 per
cent of the labor force in 1953-5; its 1971-3 share was below 15 per cent. The proportion
of self-employed and unpaid family workers fell from 58 per cent to 32 per cent. It is true
that in both percentage and absolute terms, falls in these two, partly overlapping, segments
of the labor force were actually at their peak in the years 1969-72, with average annual
decreases of 600,000 in the numbers in each category (Boltho, 1975, pp. 1 13).
4. Capital Stock
The growth of labor productivity, and the absorption ofworkers into higher
productivity jobs, would not have been possible without a high rate of investment in plant
and equipment and other directly productive capacities (Patrick and Rosovsky, pp. 17).
Japan is a market economy; capital stock lies mostly in the hands of the private sector, and
economic decisions about production, prices, and investments are motivated by a desire to
earn profits. Based on this reason the source of money supply played a locomotive role for
the economic development. There are two motivations to drive the capital into the
industrial investment, they are summarized as follows:
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a. Business and Managerial Skill Optimize the Economic Growth
Complying with the increased profits and the improved technology, the
larger firms also were encouraged to expand their market share under these trends. While
Japanese corporate investment strategy could lead to devastatingly excess capacity for a
single firm or industry, if it will be out of line with overall demand, such behavior was so
widespread that sufficient additional demand was generated for virtually all products, with
only temporary periods of excess capacity. Business optimism was thus self-fulfilling.
Simultaneously, the large firms appeared to be interested more in long-run than short-run
profit maximization and profit growth maximization as consistent and mutually reinforcing
over the long run (Patrick and Rosovsky, 1967, pp. 18).
b. High and Rising Savings Rate
Another important cause of Japan's rapid investment rate has been its high
and rising savings rate. In aggregate, all of Japan's domestic investment has been financed
by domestic savings, though of course some individual firms borrow from abroad. Not
surprisingly, the corporate sector plows back the major share of its after tax-profits-about
85 percent for the corporate sector as a whole. Even so, firms have to rely heavily on
external finances because of their high investment demand. Individual saving rates in
Japan, which were low in the early 1950s, have risen tremendously. For example, urban
workers now save about 20 percent of their disposable income-about triple the rate of
American workers. Personal saving accounts for only about a third of gross domestic
saving and of increases in savings rates, as shown in Table 6. Business depreciation
allowances have been equally important. This is primarily due to the business investment
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boom and the use of the standard declining balance method of depreciation. Despite high
retention rates, corporate profits account for less than a sixth of gross saving. The
government too is a substantial saver, mainly for investment in government building,
social overhead, and the like (Patrick and Rosovsky, pp. 19).
On the other hand, in the postwar period government savings increased
because: (1) There was a steady increase in government revenue as a result of the high
rate of economic growth, and (2) military expenditures were minimal. Besides,
government investment has also increased rapidly since the latter half of 1960s. This is
because the Japanese government has emphasized capital formation more than
consumption. The rapid capital formation by the government and private sector has
stimulated economic growth by creating effective demand and expanding productive
capacity (Minami, 1986, pp. 209).
It was truly fortunate that Japan could match a relatively high saving rate with a
strong demand for domestic investment. Without its high saving rate, Japan would have
had to borrow from abroad to maintain its high investment and its rapid growth (Ito, 1993,
pp. 63).
5. Government Policies
The main impetus to growth has come from the private sector (Patrick and
Rosovsky, 1967, pp. 20). However this is not say that economic policy played no role in
the process. It is true that the economic policy-making underestimated growth capacity in
the beginning, but it is also a fact that once growth had begun, they made every effort to
sustain it and strove to remove the barriers. Thus a series of policies for the protection and
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fostering of industry had been established before economic growth began (Nakamura,
1995, pp. 87-89).
Table 5. Japan's Gross Domestic Product and Labor Force, by Sector, 1956 and 1971
1956 1971 Average annual growth(a)
Sector Gross Labor Gross Labor National Sectoral labor force
domestic force domestic force sectoral
product product output
Primary 17.4 41.9 5.8 17.4 6.8 -4.2
Agriculture 12.5 39.3 4 15.90 6.6 -4.3
Forestry 3.2 1 0.7 0.4 3.7 -4.3
Fishing 1.7 1.6 1.1 1 12 -1.5
Secondary 34.5 23.9 41.1 35.5 15.3 4.3
Mining 2.2 1.5 0.7 0.4 6.2 -6.8
Manufacturing 27.8 17.7 33.3 27.2 15.3 4.6
Construction 4.5 4.7 7.1 7.9 17.6 5.2
Tertiary 48.1 34.1 53.2 47.2 15.9 3.8
Electricity,gas, 2.1 0.7 1.9 0.6 13.8 0.4
water
Wholesale and 16.5 13.7 17.1 19.2 16.1 3.9
retail trade
Transport and 8.5 4.6 7.1 6.4 13.4 3.9
communication
Banking and 3.8 4.8 16.6
Insurance
Real estate 3.8 6 18.1
Services 9.8 10.7 13 14.7 16.9 3.8
Public 3.7 2.7 3.3 3.3 14.2 3
administration
Source: Gross domestic product, Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Income
Statistics, 1972, pp. 282-83. Labor force, Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, 1956
Employment Status Survey Summary, p.26, table 1-3; and ibid., 1971, pp. 142-45.
a. Estimated from beginning and end-year data.
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Table 6. Gross Saving in Japan, by Components, 1952-54 and 1970-72
1952-54(a) 1970-72(a)
Component Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of








































Source: Computed from Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics,
1951-67, pp. 3, 11; EPA, Annual Report on National Income Statistics, 1974, pp.2, 10.
a. Arithmetic average of three years.
Although Japan's economic development was primarily the product of private
entrepreneurship, the government has directly contributed to the nation's prosperity. Its
actions have helped initiate new industries, cushion the effects of economic depression,
create a sound economic infrastructure, and protect the living standards of the citizenry.
Indeed, so pervasive has government influence in the economy seemed that many foreign
observers have popularized the term "Japan Incorporated" to describe the alliance of
business and government interests (Dolan and Worden, 1990, pp. 204).
B. EXTERNAL FACTORS
1. The Role of Korean War
The influence of the Korean War was nothing short of prodigious. The year 1949
was one of worldwide recession, but this state of affairs shifted a full 180 degrees the
following year as war sparked a worldwide search for strategic goods (Nakamura, 1995,
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pp. 43). On June 25, North Korea invaded South Korea, and in a matter of days the U.S.
Army was turning to Japan to provide all kinds of military support supplies, from
galvanized iron sheets and cotton duck to prefabricated buildings and chemicals. Suddenly
Japanese makers were besieged with orders for rush shipments. The price was secondary.
Japan was the closest and fastest available supplier. Within only a month, the visible effect
was startling. In the single month of August 1950, U.S. procurement officers signed
contracts with Japanese suppliers for $60 million in goods and services. Particularly, in the
second half of 1950, receipts from "invisible exports" which is where the proceeds of
military procurement in Japan were listed tripled, and during 1951 they reached almost $ 1
billion. This was three quarters as much as all other Japanese foreign exchange receipts for
the year from the whole world.
The war was a disaster to Koreans, but to Japan was a good chance to recover its
economy. The outbreak of the Korean war was a godsend to the Japanese economy. The
United States suddenly required the services of Japanese manufacturers and construction
companies. Material for the Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force brought in valuable dollars.
American special procurement paid for half of Japan's imports in 1952. The Korean
war-boom permitted the economy to take off at the same time as the country regained its
independence. Fortune certainly had favored Japan. The Japanese made the most of their
good luck. Their production, employment, and business profits all rose rapidly as the
economy surged forward into a boom. Therefore expansion continued. From 1953
onwards the managers of the Japanese economy were in unfamiliar territory, since the old
benchmarks had been passed.
40
After World War II, the devastating situation either in Europe or in Asia was
nearing collapse. The need for reconstruction was imminent. No doubt the United States
was the only country that could take this responsibility, therefore the assistance unfolded.
The United States distributed dollar funds on a massive scale under the Marshall Plan.
However, a Marshall Plan for Asia never materiallized (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 60). But
because of the United States' involvement in the Korean War, Japan became a supply base
for United States and United Nations troops. This increased the demand for
Japanese-manufactured goods and parts, and the economy grew quickly (Ito, 1993, pp.
60).
The economic growth brought about by this special procurement also led to a huge
volume of dollars for special procurement. This had an impact in the Asian region,
particularly in Japan the economic growth brought about by this special procurement led
to an increase in household wealth and a conspicious rise in the level of consumption. The
common hope, particularly of city dwellers during this time, was to recover the standard
of living they had enjoyed in the prewar period, represented by the years 1934-36. As their
incomes increased, the first items people purchased were the prewar comsumer goods like
Japanese-style clothing rice, miso, and soy sauce. This trend was reflected in the fact that
consumption of all these traditional consumer goods peaked in the early 1950s. Their
lifestyle recovered along with the standard of living. The recovery was completed by the
mid-1950s, after which living standards continued to rise but were accompanied by a
move away from the prewar lifestyle and toward a more western style of living.
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2. The Establishment of the International Monetary Fund
Technological progress and industrial development were of course responsible for
the high rate of growth in the world economy. But underlying them was the establishment
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) system for infrastructural support for this
progress, as well as the worldwide spread of full employment policies. The IMF in 1944
conceived the Bretton Woods system, a global arrangement for the management of foreign
exchange in place of the international gold standard which had been in use up until that
time (Yoshitomi, 1977).
The IMF's main feature was, in place of gold, which was chronically in short
supply, a key currency with convertibility into gold was to be established. The American
dollar was not to be convertible within the United States, but conversion by both domestic
and foreign authorities was to be authorized at the rate of $35/ounce. Since the middle of
World War II the U.S. had been commonly acknowledged to possess economic strength
surpassing that of any other country in the world, and the American dollar was selected as
the key currency over objections by John Maynard Keynes that a non-national currency
should be established instead. This choice presupposed that, as the key currency country,
the United States would contribute to the support of a global monetary system and to the
achievement of global full employment- a responsibility which the U.S. did subsequently
strive to fulfill. A second feature of the IMF was to establish a fixed exchange rate
between the key currency and the currency of each member country, with a very narrow
band within which each of these rates could fluctuate. These fixed rates were not to be
changed except when fundamental disequlibrium in the international balance of payments
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arose. In this context, a fundamental disequilibrium meant that the country was burdened
with chronic unemployment, regardless ofwhether domestic business conditions were
prosperous or slack, with the implication that an accompanying chronic payment deficit
was due to an overvalued currency. Thus, less than ten years after Keynes published his
General Theory ofEmployment, Money, and Interest (1936), full employment had been
acknowledged as a common policy goal, as was symbolized by the fact that keynes
represented Britain at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 59).
Japan re-entered the world economy in 1 949, and from the time the Japanese yen
360/US $1 rate was established until the upward yen revaluation in 1971 this rate was
consistently maintained. With the 360 Japanese yen rate as the standard, Japan's objective
during this period was to strengthen its international competitiveness. That this goal was
achieved is clear from a comparison of national export price indexes (see Table 7).
Comparing these figures with the U.S. domestic price index adjusted by the exchange rate
vis-a-vis the dollar (shown in the table in parentheses), one can observe the process
whereby Japan gradually gained an advantage over the other advanced industrial nations.
This is how the growth rate gradually rose and is the reason that it was possible to firmly
secure a balance of payments surplus by the latter half of the 1960s (Nakamura, 1995, pp.
60-61).
For 25 years after World War II, the international monetary system, known as the
Bretton Woods system, was based on stable and convertible exchange rate, with
occasional devaluations of individual currencies to collect "fundamental" disequilibria in
the balance of payments. This system had several strengths, but it also had flaws that were
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to prove fatal. Mounting pressures in the 1960s culminated in the collapse of Bretton
Woods Systems in 1971. However, the influence ofIMF exerted over Japan was
extremely important for the Japanese economic growth in that period (Root, 1994, pp.
456).
Table 7. International Comparison ofExport Price Indices, 1950-77
(1958=100)
Year Japan U.S.A. U.K. W. Germany France Italy Worl
1950 102.2 81 73 72 61 110
1955 109.3 92 89 91 71 111 99
1960 95.9 99 96 94 95 102 100
1965 100.8 104 104 102
(107)
105 102 103







1975 151.6 213 260 137 197 225 241
(183.9) (206) (219) (217) (206)
1977 160.3 242 370 142 236 324 268
(217) (228) (257) (240) (231)
Figures in parentheses were calculated by multiplying in index for that year by the American dollar
exchange rate (base year =1963).
Source: Calculated from Bank of Japan, Nihon Keizai o Chusin to sum Kokusai Hikaku Tokei
[International Comparative Statistics Focusing on Japan]
In 1968 Japan officially celebrated the centennial of the Meiji Restoration. There
was a sense of accomplishment and pride. In the one hundred years, Japan had
accomplished the overriding national goal of catching up with the West. The Japanese
moved into the 1970s riding the crest of an unprecedented prosperity. Their single-minded
pursuit of economic growth and industrial expansion, however, had left them with some
very serious social and economic imbalances, notably in the areas of social security, social
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overhead capital, and environmental safety. Furthermore, the oil crisis of 1973 brought
home a valuable lesson - the futility and danger of building an economic supermachine
relying almost exclusively on imported resources. By the mid-1970s, a new national
consensus began to emerge. The new orientation promises a more moderate and balanced
growth. This shift also made its economic growth slowdown (Haitani, 1976, pp. 8).
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IV. THE SLOWDOWN IN GROWTH
As I mentioned above, Japan enjoyed much more benefits during the high growth
period. But there are two questions I would like to raise about its slower growth decade:
why has Japan grown so much more slowly than it did before 1974?; and why has its
performance relative to other industrial nations also dropped? This disruption and
confusion of 1973-74 was so strong in Japan that it is tempting to blame the oil crisis for
everything. But the country did not return to its former high rates of expansion even after
the effects of the oil shock should have dissipated. Since oil again rose in price in 1979,
one could argue that Japan suffered through a prolonged adjustment to both episodes, so
that by the mid-1980s a renewal of higher growth rates would occur, especially when oil
prices began dropping. Higher oil prices are clearly one element in explaining what
happened, but this element is not the most important one (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 41). Those
factors which caused the slower growth may be listed as follows: 1) slower capital
formation, 2) end oftechnological catch-up, 3) higher energy costs, 4) diversification of
social goals, 5) sluggish world economic development, 6) a changing labor market, and 7)
slower productivity growth.
A. SLOWER CAPITAL FORMATION
From 1956 to 1973 real fixed nonresidential capital investment grew at a 16
percent real annual rate, though with some unevenness (Table 8). From 1974 to 1985,
however, investment growth dropped to only 3.9 percent annually. The reduction was
heavily affected by average annual real declines of -1.0 percent from 1974 to 1978. This
drop can be attributed to the one-time shock of the 1973 oil crisis and a temporary
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deceleration effect as the economy slowed. Corporations had invested in expectation of
continued high growth and now found they had more capacity than needed, so investment
temporarily dropped while output caught up with installed capacity. After this temporary
adjustment, investment grew at a 7.6 percent real annual rate, but even this was far below
the growth before 1973 (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 43-44).
Japan's economic performance can be explained by various factors. However,
during the 1970s she lagged far behind other countries in the provision of social security,
and it was, therefore, left to individual families to make provisions against illness,
unemployment or old age. And later on cost of education was also a crucial factor that
increased the government burdens and caused the investment to decline (Allen, 1981, pp.
98-99).












Sourece: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 1987, pp. 118-21; 1970, pp.
86-87; and Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1971 p. 289
a. 1956-65 average annual real growth is in 1065 prices. Other periods are based on 1980 prices.
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B. END OF TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP
The end of the technological gap between Japan and other developed countries
was critical for the slower growth of both capital formation and productivity in Japan. The
impact of technological equality on capital formation was straightforward. Because rapid
increases in productivity based on imported technology were no longer possible,
corporations could no longer expect the high levels of profit from new investments to
which they had become accustomed. With lower expectations, investment decelerated.
What had once been a powerful incentive soon evaporated in the mid-1970s (Nishimizu
and Jorgenson, 1977, Discussion Paper, pp. 556).
Moreover, it is impossible to think that Japan finally did catch up with the United
States and Western European countries technologically at some point in the mid 1970s.
Since it is harder to develop a country's own new technology than to merely obtain
licenses, Japan's growth rate then had to fall (Ito, 1993, pp. 72).
The end of the catch-up process also meant the cost of acquiring new, more
productive technology was higher. While importing technology is by no means
inexpensive, research and development expenditures are far lower than when technology is
entirely developed at home. The change in Japan's position is clear from increases in
research and development expenditures. By 1982 these expenditures (exclusive of social
science research) were 2.20 percent of GNP, up from 1.70 percent in 1973 and 1.27
percent in 1965 (U.S. expenditures were 2.61 percent ofGNP in 1982) (Tokyo: MOF,
1984).
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On the other hands, Japan could not have developed as she did, if she had not been
able to advance to the forefront of technical accomplishment. It is, therefore, rather
surprising at first sight to learn that her expenditure on industrial research and
development (R and D) has been quite modest. In 1978 it amounted to only 2. 15 percent
of the national income compared with 2.29 percent for Britain, 2.46 percent for the United
States, and 2.64 percent for West Germany (Foreign Press Center, Tokyo, October 1979).
By the mid-1980s Japan had become the acknowledged world technological leader
in a number of fields (including iron and steel, dynamic random-acess memory chips, and
automobiles). But no matter how successful it is at generating its own technology (or even
continuing to adapt advances from other countries), the profit incentive from investment in
corporations using these new technologies remains smaller than when it lagged behind and
was catching up. With a smaller profit incentive, corporate investment grew at a slower
pace. Reduced growth of investment as a result of closing the technology gap thus
becomes important in explaining reduced productivity growth due to technological change
and economies of scale because these are closely linked to capital formation (Lincoln,
1988, pp. 44-45).
C. HIGHER ENERGY COSTS
By 1985 the wholesale price index for imported oil, coal, and natural gas was more
than eight times higher than in 1970 (Table 9). The big increase came in the oil shock
years, with a 193 percent gain in 1974 and a 73 percent gain in 1980. As in other
countries, the trend in energy costs was uneven, with declines in some of the years after
the oil shocks. These increases far exceeded the overall inflation rate in the economy
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represented by the GDP deflator. The changes were more important for Japan than most
other industrialized countries since it depended on imports for such a large portion of its
total energy needs (83 percent in 1984). Among energy sources, Japan is most dependent
on petroleum. In 1973 it relied on oil for 76 percent of its total energy needs; even as late
as 1985 oil accounted for 57 percent of total needs (compared with 42 percent for the
United States in 1984). And because Japan produces almost no crude oil itself, its import
dependency is virtually 100 percent. It was especially dependent on Middle Eastern crude
oil in the early 1970s for more than 80 percent of its petroleum needs. By 1985, it was still
69 percent (Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1986).
The rising price of oil seriously affected the economy during the oil shock. First,
like other importing countries, Japan suffered a loss of income to OPEC members. As
Table 9 shows, its terms of trade worsened (meaning that the unit price of imports rose
relative to the price of exports) in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 and 1979 oil
shocks. With 1980 as 100, the terms of trade deteriorated from 203.3 in 1973 to 137.0 in
1976 and from 133.3 in 1979 to 95.9 in 1982. In the long run, again like other
oil-importing countries, Japan also faced adjustment costs in coping with the relatively
higher price of oil, but its problems were more serious than other countries. Its petroleum,
petrochemical, aluminum refining, synthetic textile, and other industries were dependent
on petroleum or petroleum-derived inputs that became relatively more expensive than in
other industrialized countries. And in some other industries Japan relied on
petroleum-dependent industries which lost their competitiveness. Government policy may
have exacerbated these problems. Import barriers erected in the 1950s and in the 1960s
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encouraged investment in some countries that, even before the oil shocks, had little chance
becoming competitive (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 46).
The aluminum industry provides the outstanding example of this adjustment
problem. Smelting aluminum requires a great deal of electric energy, and aluminum
smelters are usually located near sources of cheap hydro-electric power. In Japan the
industry depended on oil-fired electric power plants. Because of import protection and
new plants incorporating state-of-the-art technology, investment was attracted to
aluminum refining during the 1960s. By 1979, though, under the combined impact of the
two oil price hikes, the industry could not longer compete against imports. Despite efforts
to smooth and slow the process of decline (a euphemism for providing protection from the
cold winds of international competition), companies went out of business or shut down
capacity at a very rapid rate, so that by 1984 imports accounted for 71 percent of
domestic consumption of aluminum in Japan (compared with 7 percent in 1965) (Japan
Statistical Yearbook, 1986, pp. 228).
Moreover, Japan's lack of domestic energy sources had always been a fact of life.
Especially, suffered the first and second oil crises, Japanese to realize how crucial energy
was. Also became aware of the limits of world's natural resources and of Japan's
vulnerability as importer of raw materials (Ito, 1993, pp. 73).
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Table 9. Impact of Changes in Cost of Imported Energy, 1970-85
Year Import price index percent Percent change Terms of trade
for energy change from in GDP (1980=100)b
(1980=100)a previous year deflator
1970 12.4 0.8 7.7 224.5
1971 14.3 15.3 5.6 221.3
1972 13.8 -3.5 5.6 223.6
1973 14.9 8 12.9 203.3
1974 43.7 193.3 20.8 162.3
1975 52.3 19.7 7.7 145.1
1976 56.1 7.3 7.2 137
1977 53.9 -3.9 5.8 136.7
1978 43.7 -18.9 4.8 154.7
1979 57.8 32.3 3 "• 133.3
1980 100 73 3.8 100
1981 109.7 9.7 3.2 99.6
1982 121.3 10.6 1.9 95.9
1983 107 -11.8 0.8 97.8
1984 101.8 -4.9 1.2 101.8
1985 102.1 0.3 1.5 102.9
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1985, pp. 311-12; and Economic Planning Agency,
Annual Report on National Accounts, 1987, pp. 166-69.
a. Includes imported petroleum, coal, and natural gas.
b. Ratio of the unit price of exports to the unit price of imports.
D. DIVERSIFICATION OF SOCIAL GOALS
During the 1950s the Japanese shared a rather broad consensus on the desirability
of rapid economic growth. However, the disintegration of this broad public consensus in
the late 1960s was most visible and dramatic on issues relating to pollution. In Minamata,
mercury poisoned hundreds of people and deformed their offspring. In Yokkaichi, smoke
and fumes from a new complex of petrochemical plants create an upsurge in asthma and
other serious respiratory conditions. In various parts of country severe cadmium poisoning
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were caused by dumping wastes from lead and zinc smelting operations into the rivers
(Lincoln, 1988, pp. 48). People suffered acute incidents from air and water pollution.
Criticism was highly increasing.
As public pressure mounted, the government reacted with new legislation and
administrative action. In 1970 the Diet passed pollution control legislation. From 1970 and
1973 the central government's pollution control budget more than tripled, and if
investments in related organizations for pollution control are added, expenditures almost
quadrupled to 430 Japanese yen ($1.6 billion at the 1973 exchange rate). Furthermore,
regional and local government spending in these same years rose more than 2.5 times to
954 billion Japanese yen (more than $3.5 billion). Although by fiscal 1984 the central
government's environmental spending (again including transfers to other organizations)
was up to 1.15 trillion Japanese yen (approximately $4 billion), an enormous increase and
reached their limit. Government budget deficits had forced reductions of 2.5 percent in
environmental expenditures between fiscal 1983 and fiscal 1984 (Environmental Agency,
Kankyo Hakusho, 1976)
.
Increased government spending for pollution control was matched by rapid
increases in expenditures by private industry. In the iron and steel industry, spending for
pollution control as a ratio to sales rose from 0.9 percent in 1970 to 1.8 percent in 1974.
The paper and pulp industry ratio went from 1.1 percent to 3.0 percent, while in chemicals
it rose from 0.4 percent to 1.3 percent. Total private-sector investment in pollution
abatement was roughly double expenditures by the central government and almost equal
to those of local government (Environmental Agency, Kankyo Hakusho, 1976). These
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investments brought about a significant and visible improvement in environment quality.
The major cities look and feel cleaner than in the early 1970s.
On the other hand, while less dramatic than pollution issues, the gap in social
amenities also received increased government attention in the 1970s and improvements in
social infrastructure and social welfare confirm that the politicians' speeches were backed
up by substantial increases in public investment. The mileage of roads newly paved in
1980, for instance, exceeded that of side walks. It doubled between 1970 and 1975, and
almost doubled again in 1981. Investment in paved roads and sidewalks represented a
general improvement in quality and safety, contributing to a dramatic drop in traffic
fatalities. From 13.3 traffic deaths per million vehicle-kilometers in 1970, fatalities
dropped to 3.5 per million in 1980 (the comparable figure for the United States is 2.0 per
million vehicle-kilometers) (Lincoln, "Infrastructural Deficiencies, Budget Policy, and
Capital Flows," pp. 171). Besides those improvements the Japanese government also
focused on the sewage treatment system, telephone, local parks and housing to improve
the quality of life.
In 1970 only 20 percent of the population of Japan lived in districts served by
public sewage treatment system, a figure that rose to 32.5 percent by 1984. The situation
is better than it appears. As Table 10 shows, 58 percent of Japanese dwellings had flush
toilets in 1983, up from 9.3 percent in 1963, with most of the expansion taking place after
the late 1960s. A significant share of the improvement during the 1970s came from the
private investment in septic tanks, since the percentage of dwellings equipped with flush
toilets expanded so much faster than the percentage of population living in sewage
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treatment districts. Nevertheless, one is left wondering whether it is the improvement over
time or the continued high percentage of houses with primitive facilities that is the more
striking. By 1983, 74.3 percent of U.S. dwelling units were connected to public sewer
systems, and only 2.4 percent of occupied dwellings lacked some or all plumbing facilities
(Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987, pp. 710).
Next, the total area of local parks doubled from 1970 to 1981. The percentage of
households with telephone service between 1970 and 1980 tripled from 25 percent to 77
percent (Lincoln, "Infrastructural Deficiencies," pp. 159-61). (Since Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone was a government-owned corporation, this change was also closely related to
government policy decisions, which had favored business phone installations in the 1950s).
Table 10. Dwellings with Flush Toilets and Percentage ofPopulation Living in Districs
with Sewage Treatment System, Selected Years, 1968-83
Total dwellings Dwellings with Percent Percent of population
Year (millions) flush toilets with toilets in districts with
(millions) sewage treatment
system
1963 20.4 1.9 9.3 -
1968 24.2 4.1 16.9 -
1970 - - - 19.6
1973 28.7 9 31.4 -
1975 - - - 24.7
1978 32.2 14.8 46 -'
1980 - - - 28
1982 - - - 30
1,983 34.7 20.2 58.2 -
1984 _ _ _ 32.5
Source: management and Coordination Agency, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986 (Tokyo: Statistics
Bureau, 1986) pp.24-25, 516-17, 619.
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The share of government funds in Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP)
directed toward housing rose from 1 1 percent in 1965 to 25 percent by 1980, while the
share ofFLIP funds for the Japan Development Bank and the Eximbank (both of which
lend exclusively to the corporate sector) dropped from 19 percent to 8 percent. These
figures nicely demonstrate the government's movement from promoting industrial growth
to encouraging a broader improvement of living conditions. But the picture is ambiguous
because, although greater resources were channeled into housing in the 1970s, the average
dwelling remained significantly smaller than in the United States in the 1980s (Lincoln,
1988, pp. 51).
Compared with the income level increase, the amount of space per person in
Japanese houses rose as well. From approximately 14.5 square meters per household
member in 1958, the figure rose rather steadily to 25.6 square meters by 1983. There are
is no indications of any acceleration of change in the 1970s; in fact, the average annual
growth in space per person was 2.6 percent from 1959 to 1968 and 2. 1 percent in the
1970s. But if one focuses on the increase in dwelling size, the picture changes. The
average size of newly constructed dwelling units increased 1.4 percent annually in the
1960s and 3.3 percent annually in 1970s, despite slower growth of personal incomes in the
latter period (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1985, pp. 268). The contrast with the space per
person data comes from a stabilization in the number of family members per dwelling .
Still, the increase in living space left the Japanese with dwellings just over half the size of
American ones. In 1982 the total amount of heated space (excluding basements and attics,
amenities that do not exist in Japanese houses) per household member in the United States
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was 49.5 square meters, almost double the 25.6 square meter value for Japan in 1983
(Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984, pp. 47, 756). The changes in investment
patterns represented movement away from the single minded pursuit of economic growth
to a broader set of social goals.
Japanese social spending was remarkable by international comparison. According
to data published by the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Japan's ranking among OECD members on the ratio ofgovernment spending to GDP has
slipped over time. Among the twenty-two nations with data available, Japan's rank
dropped from nineteenth in 1960 to twentieth in 1982 (Paris: OECD, 1985, pp. 29).
E. SLUGGISH WORLD ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
When the oil embargo imposed by the OPEC countries was announced in October
1973, inflation took off. Inflationary expectations made the situation worse. "Wild
inflation" reached 30 percent in 1974. Wages increased more than 20 percent in that year,
since prices were also rising, but in turn the increase in wages fueled inflation, resulting in
classic example of a price-wage spiral. It took at least several years for Japan to reallocate
resources from unconditionally growth-oriented sectors to energy-conservation and
pollution-control sectors (Ito, 1993, pp. 70).
From 1975 to 1985 the volume index for Japanese exports rose at a 6.9 percent
annual rate, compared with 17.9 percent from 1961 to 1970 and 12.7 percent from 1971
to 1974. The slowdown in export growth can be attributed to slower economic growth in
the rest of the world, but this is a dimension as well. When Japan was economically a small
force in the 1950s, its exports could expand rapidly without making much difference in
58
world markets. But by the 1970s its exporting industries were important enough to
represent a significant factor to world markets. This success created two reasons for
export growth to drop. In economic terms the rapid gains of exports could be limited
either because of market saturation or because the significant size of Japanese penetration
provoked more successful counter strategies by foreign competitors. In political terms
Japan's success meant that attempts to rapidly expand exports of particular products
would engender threats of protection from trade partners or real protectionist actions
(Lincoln, 1988, pp. 56).
F. A CHANGING LABOR MARKET
In the 1970s and 1980s labor input in the Japanese economy grew somewhat more
slowly than before because of slower population growth, a decrease in hours worked, and
fewer gains from increased education. Partially offsetting these factors was a modest
reversal of the earlier downward trend in the labor force participation rates for women.
During the very early postwar period Japan experienced a baby boom similar to that in the
United States. Children born between 1947 and 1951 outnumbered the next younger
five-year group (1952-56) by 37 percent and the next older five-year group (1942-46) by
23 percent (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986, pp. 24). Since the early 1950s the birthrate
has almost continuously declined. Therefore, even if the boom is considered to have lasted
until as late as 1955, that generation was in the labor force by 1975 (Lincoln, 1988, pp.
56-57).
The slowdown since the early 1950s is clearly visible in both population and labor
force data. The number of people aged fifteen years and older grew at average annual rate
59
of 1.8 percent from 1956 to 1973 but at only a 1.2 percent rate from 1974 to 1985. Labor
force participation rates, the percentage of people fifteen years and older with jobs or
actively seeking employment, declined steadily from 70.8 percent in 1955 to 64.6 percent
in 1973, primarily because of the shift ofworkers out of agriculture led to falling
participation rates for women. However, from 1974 to 1985 participation rates stabilized;
the rate was 63.0 percent in 1985, down only slightly from the 1973 level (Japan
Statistical Yearbook, 1973-74, pp. 49).
Table 1 1 shows the effects of population growth and participation rates on the
labor force. From 195 1 to 1960 the annual growth rate of the labor force was a high 2.2
percent. From 1961 to 1973 the rate of increase slowed to 1.3 percent, and from 1974 to
1985 dropped a bit further to 1.2 percent. In addition, after unemployment had dropped
from a peak of 2.5 percent in 1955 to a stable 1.2 to 1.4 percent in the 1960s, it rose again
from 1.3 percent in 1973 to a new peak of 2.6 percent in 1985 (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 57-58).
Table 11. Labor Force Participation and Unemployment Rate, Selected Years, 1950-85


























The labor force continued to be characterized by increases in the number of years
of education in the 1970s and 1980s, but this too was changing more slowly. From 1960
to 1970 the percentage of the population aged fifteen years and older that had graduated
from high school increased from 22.2 percent to 30.1 percent; from 1970 to 1980 it
increased to 38 percent. Thus the portion of adults with high school diplomas rose by 36
percent in the 1960s and 26 percent in the 1970s. People with diplomas from all forms of
educational institutions beyond high school increased from 5.2 percent of the population
fifteen years and older in 1960 to 8.4 percent in 1970 and 13.7 percent in 1980, roughly
equal rates of growth in each decade (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986, pp. 44).
In the 1980s the percentage of each cohort completing high school appears to have
stabilized at just over 50 percent, although the data on the rising educational level of those
fifteen years and older indicate primarily that the generations educated before the reforms
initiated during the occupation were declining as proportion of the local adult population.
These trends in education suggest that gains in the quality of the labor force continued
during 1970s, but contributed less to economic growth than they had before. Any precise
estimate of the contribution of changes in education ought to be viewed with a certain
amount of suspicion - years of education are only crudely related to workers' productivity
(Lincoln, 1988, pp. 58).
Growth of labor input was also limited in the 1970s and 1980s by decreases in
hours worked. The average monthly hours per worker in all industries declined from
almost 203 in 1 960 to 1 82 in 1 973 . For manufacturing only the decline was from 207
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hours to 182, an almost identical change (Table 12) (Statistical Abstract ofthe United
States, 1987, pp. 394; and Monthly Statistics of Japan, March 1987, pp. 19).
This slow drift downward became a sharp drop as demand fell in a recession
following the oil shock. For all industries, hours dropped to 172 by 1975, and to 168 for
manufacturing. One contributor to the decline may have been the so-called lifetime
employment system in Japan. With a portion of the work force covered by an implicit job
guarantee until the mandatory retirement age, corporations tend to rely on overtime work
to put flexibility into their labor costs. Large corporations are more constrained than their
American counterparts in reducing employment when a recession hits, but they cut
over-time work heavily. Once the recession-related drop was over, hours worked in
manufacturing recovered to almost 180 a month by 1985, and more moderately to 176 for
all industries. This difference is probably due to limited opportunity for overtime in sectors
other than manufacturing. As a result of these changes, shifts in hours worked were
actually less important to labor input after 1973 than before. The average annual decline in
hours worked in 1961-73 was 0.8 percent, while 1974-85 it was only 0.3 percent
(concentrated in the recession-related drop of 1974-75) (Lincoln , 1988, pp. 58-59).
62
Table 12. Average Monthly Hours Worked, Selected Years, 1960-85









Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986 p. 110; and Bank of
Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, p.281.
To some degree offsetting the effect of the decline in hours worked on
total labor input, more women entered the labor force in the 1970s and 1980s. For all
women 15 years and older participation rates dropped until 1975, then increased modestly
to almost 49 percent by 1985 (Table 13). Considered the age group, the data indicate
some weakening of the traditional expectation that women should leave their jobs when
they get married (or at the least when they have their first child). This tradition did not
apply to work on family farms or in small enterprises, so that well over 40 percent of
women beyond their mid-20s had always remained in the labor force. Following the first
oil shock, though, more women chose to stay on the job or to return to work outside the
home more quickly after having children. For the group aged 25 to 34 participation rates
rose from 43.2 percent in 1975 to 52.2 percent in 1985, and for those aged 35 to 44 (who
have presumably finished having children) rates rose from 56.9 percent to 63.7 percent
(Lincoln, 1988, pp. 60).
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Table 13. Female Labor Force Participation, by Age Group, Selected Years, 1960-85
Age group
Year Total 15-19 20-24 25-29a 3 0-39b 40-54c 55-64 65 and order
1960 54.5* 49 70.8 54.5 57.8 59 46.4 25.6
1965 50.6 35.8 70.2 49 55.4 60.2 44.8 21.6
1970 49.9 33.6 70.6 45.5 52.9 61.8 44.4 17.9
1973 48.3 27.9 67.1 44.5 51.4 61.3 44.5 16.9
1975 45.7 21.7 66.2 43.2 56.9 59.8 43.7 15.3
1980 47.6 18.5 70 48.7 60.9 62 45.3 15.5
1984 48.9 18.5 72.4 52.1 63.7 64.1 45 15.9
1985 48.7 16.6 71.9 52.2 63.7 64.6 45.3 15.5
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Japan Statistical Yearbook,1986 P. 71; 1978, p.49;
1973-74, p .49
a. Includes ages 25-34 after 1973
<s
b. Includes ages 35-44 after 1973
c. Includes ages 45-54, only aftei 1973.
* All number represented by percent.
Although Japan benefited from having more women choosing either to stay in, or
to return to, the labor force, in a growth-accounting framework, had both a positive and
negative effect. Had women not chosen to work, the labor force would have grown even
more slowly than it did. However, because women are paid less than men, a higher share
ofwomen in the work force implies less growth in the measured value of output
attributable to labor. Males made up 62.7 percent of the labor force in 1975 but 60.3
percent by 1985 (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986, pp. 70).
Taken together these factors imply that labor's contribution to the Japanese
economy grew somewhat less rapidly after 1973 than before. As labor force growth
decelerated, creating a tight labor market, the continued rapid economic expansion of the
late 1960s and early 1970s enabled unions to negotiate the very large wage increases of
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1 973 and 1 974 mentioned earlier. This wage pressure was even more significant than
implied by the wage settlements, since the strong seniority element in Japanese wage
structures combined with the aging of the labor force implied rising wages even without
annual overall increases (Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1986, pp. 97).
After the recession of 1974, though, the situation changed. Slower economic
growth and the long-term effort of corporations to replace labor with capital moved Japan
away from the tight labor market conditions. Growth in employment, in fact, was so slow
that the employment levels rose (see Table 1 1). Reduction in the growth of labor supply in
Japan should not be considered a major cause of slower labor expansion. It needs not be a
problem if capital or technological change can be substituted. Second, the slowdown in
labor supply was relatively mild, accounting for less than 1 percentage point of the
reduction of economic growth in the growth-accounting framework. Finally, the
expansion of unemployment implies that the demographic changes slowing the expansion
of the labor force were not a constraining factor in Japan's growth performance.
Constraints lay instead in the slower growth ofthe capital stock and smaller increases in
productivity (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 61).
G. SLOWER PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Endowed with the intellectual and social capacity to efficiently absorb and adapt
foreign technology, Japan was able to achieve great leaps in productivity as the private
sector continually discovered new investment opportunities using imported technologies in
the 1950s and in the 1960s. But by the 1970s this situation was coming to its logical end.
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Productivity increases due to implementation ofnew technologies slowed because the
changes in technology became more incremental (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 61-62).
Of course, the three major factors in the end of the postwar Japanese miracle - the
oil crisis, the decrease in investment, and the slowdown in technological progress (Kosai
and Ogino, 1984, pp. 41) - were not independent of one another. The oil crisis, which
drew attention to Japan's heavy dependence on nonrenewable resources, gave many
people a pessimistic outlook and caused downward shifts in expectations of future growth
as well as in current growth potential. Japanese producers and investors suddenly became
aware of the limits of the world's natural resources and of Japan's vulnerability as an
important raw materials. Since expected future earnings fell, investment demand also fell.
The decline in investment lowered current aggregate demand as well as future capacity,
and slowed the adoption of advanced technology (Ito, 1993, pp. 71-72).
Productivity change in the growth-accounting framework includes all sources of
change, not just increases due to the new technologies. Virtually every Japanese industry
was starting from a small production base, so that economies of scale were achieved easily
as output grew and larger production facilities were constructed. This effect was
compounded in new industries, including most consumer durables, because domestic
demand for their product proved highly income-elastic. Further economies were available
as industries reached productivity levels high enough to be competitive world markets.
But by the mid-1970s these gains were largely realized, and economies of scale could no
longer be expected to contribute more to growth than they did in other industrialized
economies. In addition, the slower pace of investment in new plant and equipment reduced
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the speed with which new, larger, more efficient production facilities replaced older
facilities. Therefore, even if economies of scale could be realized, they would be realized
more slowly (Lincoln, 1988, pp. 62).
And at last, there were fewer gains to be realized from the transfer of labor from
low-productivity agriculture to other, more productive employment. The movement out of
agricultural labor was an important source of productivity growth between 1955 and 1973
because the shift took place so quickly. As Table 14 shows, the proportion of employment
in agriculture, forestry, and fishing dropped from 51.6 percent in 1950 to only 13.4
percent in 1973. This represented an absolute drop of 1 1.4 million engaged in the primary
sector. However, from 1973 to 1985 only 1.9 million people moved out, bringing the
sector's proportion of total employment down to 8.8 percent. While the movement of
workers did not come to a complete halt, it slowed from an average of 496,000 a year in
the early period to 162,000 a year in the more recent period. Part of this absolute drop
may not represent a movement of workers to other sectors as much as it does retiring
workers not offset by new entrants: the population engaged in agriculture is older on
average than the total labor force and aging more rapidly. Future migration may be further
limited because few farmers are engaged full time in agriculture. At what point Japanese
statistics move a worker from one sector to another is unclear, but only 14 percent of farm
households in 1985 were considered to be engaged full time in farming, and
nonagricultural income accounted for more than half of all farm household income (Ibid.,
pp. 149, 171). This tendency brought a slower productivity gains because so much farm
household activity was already off the farm behind the mid-1980s.
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Table 14. Employment, by Sector, Selected Years, 1950-85 (percent of total unless
otherwise specificed)
Sector
Year Total employment* Primary(a) Secondary(b) Tertiary
1950 35.7 51.6 21.7 28.6
1955 40.9 37.6 24.4 38.1
1960 44.4 30.2 28 41.8
1965 47.3 23.5 31.9 44.6
1970 50.9 17.4 35.2 47.3
1973 52.3 13.4 36.6 49.8
1975 52.2 12.7 35.2 51.9
1980 55.4 10.4 34.8 54.5
1985 58.1 8.8 34.3 56.5
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Japan Statistical Yearbook, J986, pp. 72-73; 1973-74,
pp. 50-51; 1960, pp.44-45.
a. Includes agriculture, forestry, and fishing.
b. Includes construction, mining, and manufacturing.
c. Includes services and government.
* millions.
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V. AN EVALUATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
From its economic performance since the end ofWorld War II, Japan is a shining
star in the world economic field. However, at present it faces a dilemma that can not lead
Japan to economic development as good as usual. Japan is now in a state of flux as a
consequence of the speculative asset price bubble of the late 1980s that burst in such
dramatic style. As with all such bubbles, the valuations of assets and equities lost touch
with reality and, when this confidence was questioned at the end of 1989, the bubble burst
with dire consequences for the real estate, construction and financial sectors. The resulting
hangover continues to be a drag on the economy as the banks are overwhelmed by bad
debts and property collateral which is now worth considerably less than book value. Bank
bad debts are currently estimated to be over 40 trillion Japanese yen. This is equivalent to
about 10 percent of GDP, and works out at approximately 60 per cent of the market
capitalization for the entire banking sector as ofMay 1995 (Birkett and Gifford, 1995, pp.
410-11).
Moreover, the Japanese economy developed a number of problems in the early
1990s. An economic slowdown was driven by reconstructing in the corporate sector as a
result of declining productivity and international competitiveness associated with an
appreciation in the value of the yen relative to other currencies. Japanese direct investment
abroad declined from $ 67.5 billion in 1989 to $34.1 billion in 1992 (OECD Economic
Survey, Japan (Paris:OECD, 1994, pp. 21) ). In particular, land values declined by
one-third of their peak values in 1991, and Japanese banks, which had much of their assets
tied up in land, lost money. Japanese business firms began to lose their international
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competitive position as a result of increasing labor costs and companies for the first time in
years had to lay offworkers (Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 143). I will evaluate the Japanese
economy through the following aspects: 1) appreciation of the Japanese yen, 2) Japanese
economic indicators, 3) strength of the Japanese economy, 4) weakness ofthe Japanese
economy, and 5) summary.
A. APPRECIATION OF THE JAPANESE YEN
Any trade disequilibrium cannot be maintained for too long under flexible
exchanges rates. Up to 1985, Japan had maintained an undervalued currency, i.e. an
exchange rate below a level sufficient to eliminate the trade surplus. In 1985, for instance,
the Japanese currency stood at 250 yen to a dollar, but at the Plaza Accord (Sep. 1985),
Japan acceded to the demands of other industrialized countries to let the yen/dollar
exchange rate reflect the trade balance between the two countries. Indeed, since then, the
yen has appreciated dramatically, trading at 132 yen to a dollar in the first half of 1992.
Yet, in spite ofthe substantial yen appreciation, between 1985 and 1988, Japan's trade
surplus continue to grow (Mourdoukoutas, 1993. pp. 148).
The appreciation ofthe yen against other world currencies, but particularly against
the U.S. dollar, has had a major impact on the Japanese economy. Table 15 presents a
comparison of the yen-dollar exchange rate for the selected time periods. As the table
indicates, the yen has gained in value against the dollar. The increased value of the yen has
increased labor and materials costs in Japan, thus increasing the cost of the Japanese
exports. On the other hand, foreign producers were able to increase their share of the
domestic markets as the cost of imports in Japan decreased (Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 143).
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Source: Economic Report of the President 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office,
1996), 400; Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1996, C17.
B. JAPANESE ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Table 1 6 presents key economic indicators for Japan and the United States.
Japanese GDP is second only to that of the United States. Unlike the United States, it has
a positive balance of its merchandise trade and current accounts (Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 143)
and a deficit in its service account. Its real rate of economic growth, although erratic in the
1990s, was the highest for all major industrial countries during the 1980s. The rate of
inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) has been the lowest for all
industrial countries, and the unemployment rate for 1995 was just over one-half of the
U.S. unemployment rate and one-third of the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom












Table 16. A Comparison ofKey Economic Indicator for Japan and the United States,
1994 and 1995*
Real GDP, 1994 ($ billions)
Real GDP growth, 1985-1994 (percent)
Merchandise exports ($ billions)
Merchandise imports ($ billions)
Merchandise trade balance ($ billions)
Services ($ billions)
Current account ($ billions)
Industrial Production (1987=100 percent)
Consumer price index (1982-84=100
percent)
Unemployment rate, 1995 3.2 5.6
* 1995 data are preliminary
Source: The World Bank, World Bank Atlas 1996 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996), 18, 19;
Economic Report of the President 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996),
398,399,402; OECD Economic Surveys, Japan (Paris: OECD, 1994), 29-45.
C. STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
Lester Thurow posed the question ofwho, in economic terms, would own the
twenty-first century- Japan, Europe or America (Thurow). He listed various strengths the
Japanese possess that will make them a serious contender. Among these strengths are
cohesion and homogeneity, which give Japan an ability to focus its economic might that
few other countries possess. Japanese culture is its major strength. Also, Japan is the
world's largest creditor nation, with a trade surplus that has been averaging around $120
billion a year (Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 144). This surplus adds to the amount of Japanese
savings that can be used to finance investment to secure future economic success. In
head-to-head competition against U.S. and European firms, its companies have proved to
be hard to beat. Japanese high school students score well in any international achievement
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test, and its ability to train workers in the labor force is unmatched (Schnitzer, 1997, pp.
144). In addition, lifetime employment and seniority-based wage and promotion systems
are, of course, the two pillars of corporate efforts to win employees' identification with
and loyalty to the company. This is also part of Japanese competitive capability (Haitani,
1981, 87).
Moreover, Japan has the most equal distribution of income of all of the world's
high-income economies. There is a far smaller gap between haves and have-nots in Japan
than there is in the United States. The Japanese government has undertaken measures to
promote more efficiency. Efforts have been made to deregulate the economy to promote
competition. Particularly, the inefficient distribution system, which has added as much as
20 percent to the cost of food, is being deregulated (OECD Economic Survey, Japan
(Paris: OECD, 1994), 29). To improve access to the Japanese domestic market, active
measures have been taken to lower barriers to imports and foreign direct investment. The
former will lower food prices and the latter will provide Japan access to new technology
(Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 144-45).
D. WEAKNESS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
The 1990s posed crucial challenges for Japan. With its financial institutions
weakened, asset prices collapsing, trade frictions persisting, and foreign policy in flux,
Japan faces a difficult period. In addition, sharp and sudden changes in the international
political economy have transformed the environment within which Japanese policymakers
have framed their foreign policy decisions for the last forty years. Especially, the collapse
of Japan's asset prices in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the long-postponed but
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inevitable return to normalcy of an economy caught in a speculative fever that sustained a
high rate of economic growth for five years beginning in 1987 (Alexander, no. 11, March
20, 1992). Deregulation and internationalization of the Japanese economy, particularly its
financial system, ensured that the Japanese economy could not continue long in its upward
spiral (Unger, 1993, pp. 198).
On March 25, 1995, Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of Tokyo announced a merger
that, if consummated, would create the largest bank in the world with assets of $820
billion (Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1995, 1). The merger reflects the problems that
have existed in the Japanese banking system, in particular property loans that turned bad
when Japanese real estate values declined by as much as 30 percent in the early 1990s. In
1994 Japan's major banks disclosed that they had lost $ 134 billion in property loans.
However, despite the decline in land value, land still remains an expensive proposition in
Japan. Real land prices in Japan have risen by more than 6 percent a year on average
during the period 1955-1994, an overall increase of twelve times (OECD, Japan, 73). This
has made the distribution of property wealth in Japan more unequal. Table 17 presents an
international comparison of housing prices.
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Table 17. International Comparison ofHousing Prices, 1990 or 1991 (dollars)
Housing Japan France Germany United United
Kingdom States
Detached house, nationwide
Price 442,000 262,000 168,800
Ratio to average earning 15.5 9.8 7.5
Detached house, capital city
Price 660,100 436,800 244,100
Ratio to average earnings 20.6 16.4 10.8
Apartment, capital city
Price 457,000 263,000 156,100 140,200
Ratio to average earnings 13.5 11.4 5.8 6.2
3.9
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Japan (Paris; OECD, 1994), 80.
The Japanese economy also faces other weaknesses. Demographics is probably its
most serious problem. Nowhere in the industrial world is the phenomenon of population
aging occurring more rapidly than in Japan. By the year 2025, it is predicted that it will
have the oldest population in the world (The Economist, January 27, 1996, Survey, 1-16).
This will have a major impact on the Japanese economy in that it will increase the demand
for government social services. Financing new and expanding government services will
required revisions in the Japanese fiscal system as the number of persons 65 and older is
projected to hit 42 percent by the year 2020. The size of the Japanese labor force will
decline relative to the number of retirees (Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 146).
E. SUMMARY
At one time, Japan was supposed to be the heir apparent to the United States as
the world's leading economic superpower. It had shown faster growth and invested more
in future growth than any other country. It became the world's largest creditor nation, with
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the world largest trade surplus. Its market share ofworld exports increase steadily, and its
manufacturing firms often dominated competition against American and European firms.
But times have changed, and although Japan is still a major economic power, there is little
likelihood that it will catch up with the United States. Its success has been driven by an
export-led economy, and domestic industries have often been inefficient by world
standards. Japan will find it increasingly difficult to use exports as the leading edge for its
domestic economy. To grow faster than the rest of the world, Japan's export industries
will have to capture larger and larger foreign market share, and this not likely to happen
(Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 146).
Furthermore, Japan emerged as the world's largest economy with the most
powerful finance, manufacturing, service industries, and strength of corporations ensured
a continuing Japanese capacity to exercise influence globally. Also, Japanese economic
and technological leadership will continue to afford Japan the means of fashioning a
foreign policy based on this strengths (Unger, 1993, pp. 199).
But Japan also has other problems. The use of poison gas by religious extremists
in the Tokyo subway system illustrates how vulnerable Japan can be to terrorism. The
earthquake that destroyed much ofKobe illustrates another problem, the ever present
possibility of natural disasters. Life expectancy in Japan is the highest in the world, which
means that the Japanese will live longer and will cost more in terms of the provision of
social services. The birthrate has been declining so fewer Japanese will enter the labor
force. Japan's strength is its cohesive internal culture based on history, tradition, and
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language, but this can also become a weakness. Its culture, which is very difficult to join,
may not absorbs workers from other societies (Schnitzer, 1997, pp. 146-47).
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VI. JAPAN IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA
The collapse of Soviet power ended the bilateral confrontation of the Cold War.
The transformation of the Japanese role became more important. By the end of Cold War,
Japan had become an economic power surpassing any European country in economic
authority and rivaling the United States for economic influence. As one of the world's
economic leaders, Japan faced the intricacies of a changing world. It may seriously be
concerned over tendencies such as the emergence of regionalism. Japan's postwar
economic strategy, and the restructuring of the triangular relationship with China and
United States, seeks a new role in the post-Cold War era in order to protect Japanese
interests either regionally or internationally.
A. FACING ECONOMIC REGIONALISM
1. European Community (EC)
The emergence of the European Community caused great concern to Japan's
global trade strategy. In case this high consuming area would integrate into the European
Community (EC) in the near future, the cautious Japanese definitely will take some actions
to deal with this major world trade bloc. Whether this issue will become a reality or not,
we should examine its history and make a scrupulous inspection.
Actually, the confidence of the European Community was badly shaken by the
economic shock of 1970s and early 1980s. High unemployment seemed to be endemic in
Europe. The GNP growth, which for countries like France and Germany had been 3-4
percent in the 1960s and 1970s, fell to half that rate by the early 1980s. Meanwhile, Japan,
the United States, and the industrializing nations of Asia emerged from the two recessions
with strong growth of manufacturing in North America and Asia. Manufacturing is usually
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the most dynamic part of a nation's industrial sector, but in Europe its growth slowed to a
virtual standstill between 1980 and 1985 even while it surged ahead in the Pacific Basin.
Driven by an accelerating pace of innovation and industrial adjustment to international
competition, several Pacific nations provided a striking contrast to stagnation in Europe's
quaint "museum" for visiting Americans and Asians (Borthwick, 1992, pp. 523).
We know now that Europe's pessimism was only a temporary phenomenon. By the
end of the 1980s the EC had begun to reassert its role as a global economic player- so
much so that the next century stands as much of a chance ofbeing christened "European"
as "Pacific." A major impetus for Europe's newly found resolve was the challenge it
recognized in the North American/Western Pacific commercial axis. Private industries in
Europe realized that unless action was taken by their governments to create a large,
integrated market in the EC, they would be permanently inferior to and dependent upon
giant Asian and North American companies. Effective international competition in newer,
high technology fields requires vast economies of scale and integrated markets that only an
economically unified Europe can provide. Monetary reform, rationalization of technical
standards, and market integration promise to rejuvenate the EC. This challenge from
Europe, in turn, has further stimulated Pacific Basin interest in regional cooperation
(Borthwick, 1992, pp. 523). So far Japan's actions to integrate the Asia-Pacific countries'
economies may also hint that EC integration will really take place in the near future.
2. North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The emergence of regionalism in Japanese views may use a Chinese saying to
describe it "Blessings never come in pairs; misfortunes never come singly." If the NAFTA
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is fully realized and excludes Japan, this impact will be more severe than the EC. The
reason is not only that the NAFTA is Japan's biggest trading partner, but it also may cause
a clash with the United States in trade issues. To the Japanese they may have much more
concern about the development ofNAFTA and negatively estimate its impact on the
Japanese economy.
Since U.S. international competitiveness eroded compared to the past, the idea to
protect continental markets has grown more attractive. More people in the United States
now believe that U.S. trading partners have not been playing fair. Many people point out
that whereas Japanese goods and firms have almost unrestricted access to the U.S.
market, it is exceedingly difficult for U.S. goods and firms to penetrate the Japanese
economy (Gilpin, 1993, pp. 27). At the same time this gives Americans reason to rethink
regionalism.
Undeniably, the United States plays a crucial role to integrate the NAFTA area.
Based on its global role, the U.S. will not act to integrate the area globally. Prospects for
the future ofNAFTA development may not achieve a consensus in the near term.
However, the existing initiative to integrate the area's economy may shape the Japanese
leaders' perceptions of their vital interest.
3. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
APEC was inaugurated in November 1989 in Canberra, in response to Australian
Prime Minister Bob Hawke's call for a regional ministerial level gathering on economic
cooperation. From the beginning, there was no consensus on the pace and scope of
cooperation, reflecting the wide diversity of interests in the region. For example, the Bush
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administration was skeptical about multilateralism, while ASEAN felt threatened by the
creation of a rival institution. As a result, APEC became an informal process for policy
coordination and dialogue that worked through consensus and avoided contentious
agendas. Even the absence of an institutional appellation in its title reflected its fragility
(Purington and Goldman, 1996, pp. 40).
APEC's basic guiding principles were agreed upon at its first meeting: (1) to
sustain growth and development in the region in order to improve living standards and the
growth ofthe world economy; (2) to encourage open dialogue and consensus; (3) to
pursue a mode of cooperation based on informal exchanges of views and not negotiations;
and (4) to strengthen an open multilateral trading system and not to encourage the
formation of a trading bloc (Lee, 1994, pp. 3-5). As result, APEC functioned as an
informal consultative mechanism and forum aimed at promoting dialogue among its
members (Purrington and Goldman, 1996, pp 40).
At the second APEC meeting in 1 990, hosted by Singapore, working groups were
established in order to explore potential avenues for cooperation. At the third APEC
meeting hosted by South Korea in 1991, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan became
members, expanding the original membership composed of the ASEAN-6: Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. At the Fourth meeting,
in 1992, hosted by Bangkok, over the objections of some countries, a small secretariat was
established in Singapore with a budget of $ 2 million, reflecting APEC's increasing
institutionalization. At the fifth meeting, held in Seattle in 1993, APEC's institutional
status was upgraded when Clinton invited state leaders to attend a summit designed to
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discuss the future pace and agenda ofAPEC. APEC membership expanded to include
Mexico and Paupa, New Guinea. Its institutionalization further deepened with the
establishment of the committee on trade and investment, but U.S. interest in using APEC
as a forum for promoting trade liberalization was opposed by ASEAN, especially
Malaysia's Mahathir bin Mohamad, who opposed APEC's increasing institutionalization
and did not attend the summit. Japan and China were also increasingly concerned that
APEC and the New Pacific Community would become a vehicle for realizing U.S. trade
preferences (Purrington and Goldman, 1996, pp 40-41).
Because ofthe concern of most Asian countries about the U.S. intention to turn
APEC into a forum for the negotiation of a Pacific free trade arrangement, it was rejected
by most Asian states. However in 1995, the Osaka Action Agenda stated that APEC
members would achieve free and open trade and investment by encouraging in concert
voluntary liberalization in the region; by supporting and stimulating further momentum
toward global liberalization; and by taking collective actions to advance trade liberalization
objectives (APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Osaka, Japan, November 19, 1995).
There are some issues that members need to achieve a consensus on, particularly,
in trade liberalization. Although the members still dispute some issues, to some extent
APEC is more institutional than the EC and NAFTA. From its establishment and
development it is also more efficient than those two regional organizations. Since it was
established in 1989, its participants have grown to 18 states. Prospects for the future of
the organization will be developed as more functions and more states will join it under the
support by Japan, U.S. and China. And Japan certainly will play a vital role in APEC since
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this is the only Asian platform that no country will exclude Japan. At the same time based
on its economic capability, that made Japan play a crucial role as well. On the contrary,
this is also a big challenge to the Japanese - how to play the leading role and solve the
disagreements among those members.
B. THE NEW ECONOMIC STRATEGY SHIFT TO ASIA DURING
THE POST COLD WAR ERA
What made Japan shift its investing direction to Asia-Pacific Countries? Generally
speaking, there are both internal and external factors to describe this diversity. To some
extent, Japan felt that rising regionalism is disadvantageous to its trade-oriented economy.
These included such bilateral and regional arrangements as the North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the accelerated movement toward European integration. On
the other hand, the highly competitve relationship with the United States and the huge
trade deficit between both countries may also cause potential conflict in the near future.
Internally, the Japanese yen's bearish depreciation caused Japanese products to
become less competitive. This also made Japan adopt a strategy of moving closer to the
similar geographical and cultural area- Asia- Pacific countries. Especially, since the region
is the most economically booming area, how can Japan ignore the opportunity? The
answer is obvious that Japan will not ignore the tendency. Moreover, its role in the region
maybe good for shaping its overall policies. The roles of the Japanese in this region can be
summarized as follows: 1) Japan as a capital supplier, 2) Japan as a technology provider,
and 3) Japan as an absorber.
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1. Japan as a Capital Supplier
During the 1980s Japan decisively supplanted the United States as the leading
source of manufactured goods, new business investment, technology and economic aid in
an area stretching from South Asia to the Pacific Islands (Cronin, 1990). In the late 1980s
in response to currency realignments after the Plaza Accord. Japanese companies found
themselves confronting production costs at home that were far higher than those of their
competitors in the NIEs. In order to remain competitive, they moved rapidly to locate new
production off-shore. A major share of their investment went to NIEs and Southeast Asia
(Borthwick, 1992, pp. 512-13).
In 1992, Japanese capital flow to developing countries in Asia was over $10.2
billion, or about 38.6 percent of the total amount going to the region (Paris: Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1994). In terms of Official Development
Assistance (ODA), Asia continues to be the largest recipient of Japanese aid. In 1993, the
amount ofODA disbursements to Asia was $4.86 billion, or 59.5 percent of the total aid
program. Japan's aid to Asian countries is now more than two-and-half times that of the
United States. Of the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have
consistently been among the top eight recipients of Japanese economic assistance, and
Malaysia has also frequently ranked in the top ten. In recent years, Japan's aid programs
have focused increasingly on supporting the development efforts of reformist communist
states in East Asia: China and Vietnam. One year after the June 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown, Japan was the first advanced industrial country to resume its aid to China. In
1991, China became the largest recipient of Japan's ODA after Indonesia. In December
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1994, Tokyo announced a three year (1996-98) aid package that will make China the top
ranking country for Japanese aid (Smith, 1995, pp. 25-26). After the conclusion of the
Cambodian peace agreement in October 1991, Japan urged Vietnam to cooperate with the
United States regarding information relevant to American serviceman missing-in-action
(Awanohara, 1992, pp. 12-13). When U.S.-Vietnamese relations subsequently improved
(albeit still short of full normalization) in November 1992, Tokyo quickly ended its freeze
on official assistance to Vietnam and extended a commodity loan of about 45.5 billion
Japanese yen ($365 million) to help pay for imports (Mochizuki, 1995, pp.128).
There has also been a change in the nature of Japan's assistance programs to East
Asia. Whereas before the primary objective was to promote access to raw materials,
Japanese aid programs are now emphasizing the cultivation of export-oriented
manufacturing industries through the promotion ofjoint ventures and technical training as
well as infrastructure development. As part of this shift in thinking, Japan announced in
August 1986 the New Asian Industries Development Plan (or New AID Plan) for the
ASEAN countries which mandated the coordination of private investment trade, and
ODA, so that they would become "three sides of one body" (sanmi-ittai). In December
1987, the government announced a $ 2 billion loan package as part of this initiative
(Arase, 1991).
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) also serves as a conduit for supplying
Japanese capital to East Asia. In 1991, ADB's loans totaled $4.89 billion. Japan and the
United States are the largest shareholders in this regional development bank with 16.3
percent each. Japan, however, provides 37 percent of the ADB's soft loans compared to
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only 17 percent for the United States. To pay for its operations, the bank has tapped
heavily into Japanese yen markets. The yen is the ADB's principal borrowing currency and
accounts for nearly 40 percent of its gross and outstanding borrowings. Having succeeded
in economic development, the East Asian NIEs are no longer borrowers from the bank.
Even Thailand has paid its ADB loans without borrowing more. Consequently, the major
borrowers from the ADB among the ASEAN Four are now Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Malaysia (Rowley, 1992, pp.4 1-42, 46-49).
Commercial lending is another way in which Japan provides capital. Currently,
Japan's commercial banks lend about $6 billion per year to the rest of Asia, which amounts
to roughly 20 percent of their total foreign loans. The total outstanding loans in the region
come to about $51 billion, or 10 percent of Japanese banks' global exposure. Bank of
Japan officials have stated that a larger portion of new commercial lending is likely to go
to Asia than the United States and Europe. A major reason for this is the fact that given
the region's higher growth rate, return on assets tend to be higher and loan default lower
(Rowley, 1991, pp. 40).
The most dramatic change in Japanese capital flows to East Asia has taken place in
foreign direct investments (FDI). The steep appreciation of the yen after the 1985 Plaza
Accord compelled Japanese corporations to shift a large part of their lower-value-added,
labor intensive production overseas, especially to the East Asian economies. Japan's
annual FDI in the East Asian NIEs soared from $718 million in 1985 to a peak of $4.9
billion in 1989. Despite some decline since then, Japanese FDI in these economies totaled
$2.4 billion in 1993. These investments increasingly reflect an interest in developing parts
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supplier networks rather than merely building assembly plants. Direct investment to the
other ASEAN states have also increased comparably. Japan's annual FDI in the ASEAN
four expanded from $ 596 million in 1985 to a peak of $ 3.24 billion in 1990. The increase
was sharpest for Thailand (from $48 million in 1985 to $1.28 billion) and for Malaysia
(from $408 million in 1985 to $880 million in 1991). In 1990, new Japanese direct
investments in the ASEAN states exceeded those of the United States by a four-to-one
margin (Grimm, 1992, pp 2,4).
In terms of regional distribution ofFDI, the Japanese emphasis in East Asia does
not seem to be so striking at first, as Figure 3 shows, despite the relative increase of direct
investments targets. But the trend for outward investments in manufacturing is more
dramatic. In 1985, 52.0 percent of Japan's foreign manufacturing investments went to
North America and 13.7 percent to Europe. Only 19.6 percent of such investments went
to Asia. But in 1993, while the proportion of Japan's manufacturing FDI to North America
dropped to 37.2 percent and the percentage for Europe was 18.3, the proportion of
manufacturing investments in East Asia rose to 32.2 percent. In the near future, East Asia
is likely to surpass North America as the foremost geographic target for FDI in
manufacturing (Tokyo: Nomura Sogo Kenkyujo, 1994, pp. 14). Japanese firms have
found investments in Asia to be much more profitable than those in the United States.
Whereas only 20 percent of the direct investments in America showed a profit within two
years, 80 percent of those in East Asia did so. Moreover, the higher projected growth
rates for the region compared to North America, Latin America and Europe will make
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East Asia the most attractive investment target of Japanese firms in the coming decade
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Figure 3 Japan's Foreign Direct Investment
Source. Japanese Ministry of Finance.
*East Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand.
Russia and North Korea remain low priority countries from the perspective of
Japanese capital. Japan articulated the notion of separating politics and economics (seikei
fukabun) to promote its economics ties with Russia. A bilateral territorial dispute
continues to be the major impediment to a large
-scale Japanese aid package to Russia. In
an attempt to engineer a breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations just prior to Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachiv's visit to Tokyo, Ozawa Ichiro (then secretary-general of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party) reportedly worked with the Ministry of International
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Trade and Industry (MITI) and business leaders to put together a major aid package of
$26 billion in the spring 1991 as a quid pro quo for meaningful Soviet concessions on the
territorial question (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1991 and The Economist, November 7, 1992, pp.
87-88).
However, Gorbachev was no position to make such concessions given the intense
domestic pressure that he faced, and the summit between him and Prime Minister Kaifu
Toshiki yielded little progress. Although hopes for another breakthrough were raised after
the failed Soviet coup and the collapse of the Soviet Union, they were again dashed when
Russian President Boris Yeltsin abruptly canceled his scheduled visit to Tokyo in
September 1992. Yeltsin finally visited Tokyo to meet with Prime Minister Morihiro
Hosokawa in October 1993. Although the summit improved the atmosphere of bilateral
relations, it did not lead to much progress on the territorial issue. Despite the impasse in
Russo-Japanese relations, joint ventures such as the oil and natural gas project off
Sakhalin Island have continued to move forward. Moreover, MITI officials have shown
enough interest in Russian economic reform to present a report in May 1 992 outlining
their policy suggestions to the Russian government (Mochizuki, 1995, pp. 131-32).
Although North Korea remains the main country in Northeast Asia outside the
reach of Japanese business, Korean residents in Japan who are aligned with the
Pyongyang regime have provided North Korea with large amounts of foreign capital
through remittances. Having been largely abandoned in economic terms by its two patrons
(China and the Soviet Union), North Korea now faces a severe economic crisis and is
under acute pressure to open itself up to foreign investments. The surprise visit to
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Pyongyang ofLDP leader Kanemam Shin in October 1990 at first suggested that Japan
might relieve some of this pressure by paying reparations and normalizing relations. But
Japan's Foreign Ministry successfully reigned in this bold move, using the reservations
expressed by Seoul and Washington as well as indications that Pyongyang has been trying
to develop nuclear weapons. At this point, Japan has little economic incentive to move
ahead of either South Korea or the United States with North Korea. The 1994 nuclear
agreement between Pyongyang and Washington, however, could open the way for limited
Japanese business involvement in North Korea. Japan is expected to fund a major portion
of the light-water nuclear reactors that are to be provided to North Korea as part of this
accord (Mochizuki, 1995, pp. 132).
2. Japan as a Technology Provider
One salient feature of recent economic relations between Japan and its Asian
partners has been the latter's demand on the former not only for the opening of its market,
but for the transfer of technology that will contribute to development of their processing
and export industries. The technology transfer question was taken up in the second
Japan-ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting held in Tokyo in June 1985, where strong
expectations were voiced by the ASEAN nations for economic and industrial
modernization and transfer of management and business expertise (Masuzoe, 1986, pp.
68).
The Japanese government tends to define this task in terms of education and
training. For example, it emphasizes that the leading four ASEAN countries (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) suffer from an acute shortage of technicians and
91
that this shortage is impeding foreign direct investment. Consequently, official agencies
such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry have recommended the
establishment of Industrial Technology Training Centers in the various ASEAN countries
(Sho, 1990, pp.99). Although such efforts are welcome, the East Asian economies are
much more interested in the technologies belonging to the Japanese private sector.
Japanese firms, however, have been generally cautious about transferring technology for
fear of aiding potential rivals-especially in the East Asian NTEs (Mochizuki, 1995, pp.
132).
For example, South Koreans have frequently complained that Japanese firms are
willing to license only older-generation technology. In the period 1985-90, Japan
accounted for 1,829 instances of technology transfer to South Korea out of total of 3,860
instances, or about 47.4 percent. The total licensing costs ofthese Japanese technology
transfers, however, amounted to only about 31.9 percent of the costs of all international
technology transfers to South Korea. The average value of Japanese transfers in 1985-90
was $0.66 million, whereas the average value ofU.S. transfers (ofwhich there were
1,116) was $1.66 million. The relatively lower value of Japanese licensing fees seems to
confirm Japan's reluctance to transfer the more advanced technologies. To explain this
reluctance, Japanese firms point to South Korea's inadequate protection of intellectual
property rights and the inability of Japanese companies to apply for South Korean patents
on products as well as processes-a privilege accorded to American and European firms
(Saito, 1992, pp. 8-9).
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Japanese economies seem to be less hesitant about transferring technology when it
is done in the context of developing business partners overseas. For example, in Taiwan,
Japanese firms are providing technical assistance to local producers so that they can
become suppliers of high-quality parts of Japanese subsidiaries. In this context, Taiwanese
firms signed 105 technical assistance contracts with Japanese counterparts in 1990. This
figure surpassed the number of contracts concluded with U.S. (50) and European (30)
firms (Saito, 1991, pp. 10-11).
Finally, how is Japan doing as an absorber of the productive output of the East
Asian economies?
3. Japan as an Absorber?
In large part because ofyen appreciation, Japan's imports from the East Asian
NIEs increased substantially from about $9.8 billion in 1985 to over $26.9 billion in 1993,
a jump of 174 percent. Japan's import performance relative to that of the United States has
also improved. Whereas Japan imported only 25.2 percent of the amount that the U.S.
imported from the East Asian NTEs in 1985, it imported nearly 41.8 percent of the amount
of U.S. imports in 1993. Imports from the ASEAN Four have also increased. In 1985,
Japan purchased about $16.7 billion of goods from these developing countries; but in
1993, it bought over $29 billion- a rise of almost 74 percent. Although the ASEAN Four
countries primarily served as raw material suppliers in the past, even these developing
states are beginning to export more manufactured goods to Japan (Mochizuki, 1995, pp.
133).
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Accompanying this increase in Japan's absorption of East Asian goods, however,
has been a sharp expansion of its exports to the region. During the 1985-93 period,
Japan's exports to the East Asian NIEs grew by nearly $58 billion, or almost 257 percent.
Consequently, despite yen appreciation, Japan's trade surplus with the East Asian NIEs
increased by about $40.9 billion, or over 323 percent. There also has been a surge in
exports to the ASEAN Four, from about $7.3 billion in 1985 to over $32.7 billion in 1993
(a jump of over 348 percent). This trend reflects the growing demand for Japanese capital
goods as these developing countries promote their manufacturing capabilities.
Consequently, Japan's trade balance with the ASEAN Four has shifted from a deficit of
$9.41 billion in 1985 to a surplus of over $3.75 billion in 1993. China is the one major
country in East Asia that goes against this trend in Japanese trade patterns. Although
Japan had a trade surplus with China of almost $6 billion in 1985, it posted a deficit of
about $3.3 billion in 1993. But this statistic may be somewhat misleading in light of the
dramatic increase of Japanese exports to Hong Kong from $6.5 billion in 1985 to nearly
$22.7 billion in 1993. A significant portion of these Hong Kong directed exports may be
ultimately going to mainland China (Mochizuki, 1995, pp. 133-34).
In the aggregate, the East Asian economies now represent a much larger export
market for Japan than either the United States or the European Community (see Figure 4).
Therefore, even while Japan's imports from the region have increased significantly, the
steeper rise in exports to the region have caused Japan's trade surplus with East Asia as a
whole to swell from about $9.2 billion in 1985 to nearly $54 billion in 1993 (see Figure 5).
The U.S. trade pattern is generally a mirror image of Japan's. Although America's export
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performance to the East Asia region (excluding Japan) has improved substantially (from
$24.9 billion in 1985 to over 74.9 billion in 1993), imports from the region have grown
even more (from about $51.8 billion in 1985 to over 125.5 billion in 1993). Consequently,
the U.S. trade deficit with East Asia (excluding Japan) has ballooned from about $26.9
billion in 1985 to nearly $50.6 billion in 1993, (see Figure 6). Although much of this
deficit is with China ($22.8 billion in 1993), the United States also has net deficits with the
East Asian NIEs ($14.5 billion) and the ASEAN Four ($13.3 billion). While the U.S.
deficit with the East Asian NIEs has declined by 3 1.3 percent from 1985 to 1993, the
deficit with the ASEAN has increased by 126.4 percent. Also during the 1985-93 period,
the U.S. trade deficit with Japan rose from $43.5 billion to over $60.5 billion. In short, as
Japan's trade surplus with East Asia has grown, so has America's trade deficit with the
region (see Figure 7). Put differently, Japan has a large and growing trade surplus with
both the United States and East Asia, while the United States has a large and growing
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Figure 4. Japan's Direct Export
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 5. Japan's Trade with East Asia
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 6. U.S. Trade with East Asia
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Figure 7. Trade Balance with East Asia
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance and U.S. Department of Commerce.
*East Asia = NIEs, ASEAN 4, and China.
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Despite the tendency for Japan to purchase more of the East Asian output, the
United States remains the chief absorber of the region's production. Japan has not
expanded its absorption of the output of East Asia's growing productive capacity at the
rate necessary to restrain further increases in East Asian exports to the United State.
Although it is not evident from the aggregate trade statistics, a significant portion of the
expansion of Japan's two-way trade with East Asian NIEs and the ASEAN states seem to
be managed by Japanese multinational business networks, or Keiretsu. To overcome high
labor costs at home, Japanese corporations are establishing production and marketing
subsidiaries in the East Asian countries. In addition to selling and sourcing in the local
market, these subsidiaries then export some of their output back to Japan, as well as
exporting intermediate goods and higher value-added parts from their affiliates in Japan. In
short, Japanese business networks are cultivating a system of "captive" exports and
imports between Japan and the rest ofEast Asia (Grimm, pp. 4-7 and Okazaki, 1992, pp.
69-70).
Such a system works to the advantage of Japanese corporations because they can
modulate the trade flows so as to minimize the dislocative effects on affiliate firms back in
Japan. But this practice also has two other consequences. It can restrain the expansion of
East Asian manufactured exports to Japan, and it can cause a major part of the output of
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Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia to be exported to a third market like the United States
(Encarnation, 1992, pp. 180-81).
The above analysis shows that Japan's primary role has been to provide the East
Asian NIEs and the ASEAN Four with capital, technology, and intermediate goods. Using
these inputs, the East Asian NIEs and the ASEAN Four have, in turn, developed their own
manufacturing capabilities. As the flow of Japanese capital has increasingly taken the form
of direct investments, Japanese corporations have managed to expand their business
networks in East Asia through joint ventures with local government and firms and through
the establishment of subsidiaries. On the technology transfer front, Japanese firms seem
extremely cautious about making technology transfers to actual and potential East Asian
competitors. However, they appear more willing to transfer technology if this is done in
the context ofjoint ventures with local entities or with the aim of cultivating local
suppliers. As in the case of direct investments, Japanese firms are using technology
transfers as an instrument to expand their business network in the region. Although Japan
has undeniably increased its imports from the East Asian economies, it is the United
Stated-and not Japan-which still serves as the primary foreign absorber ofEast Asia's
productive output (Takenaka, 1991, pp. 117-24).
By expanding its network capitalism into the East Asian NIEs and ASEAN Four,
Japan has both improved and organized the productive capabilities of these economies.
But Japan has not adequately assumed the role of importer. Despite the increase in
regional economic integration, a self-contained regional economic bloc involving Japan,
the East Asian NIEs, and ASEAN is impossible because most of these economies are net
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exporters. Until the leading East Asian economies, including Japan, become larger demand
absorbers, regional economic harmony will be contingent on access to the U.S. Market
(Mochizuki, 1995, pp. 139).
C. THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP AMONG JAPAN, CHINA,
AND THE UNITED STATES
1. Japan and China
Japanese businessman are always keener than the other countries' businessmen.
Since China decided to modernize, the Japanese businessmen had already yearned for the
potential largest market. In the late 1970s, once it became clear that Deng Xiaoping's
reforms were truly underway, Japan accelerated its aid and loans to China. By 1982 China
had become Japan's largest aid recipient, displacing Indonesia (Borthwick, 1992, pp. 513).
Furthermore, in recent years, Japanese investments indicate a booming interest in China.
FDI in China shot up from about $579 million in 1991 to over $1.69 billion in 1993. From
the economic perspective the relationship seems to be getting better year by year.
Traditionally, Japan always looked up to China. However, since the Meiji
Restoration that made Japan become a modern country, the 1895 Sino-Japan war in which
Japan defeated China, and imperial policies that gained a great deal of profit from China
the situation totally changed. It is worth mentioning that the Japanese fiercely committed
numberless atrocities from 1895 to 1945. The historical hatred by the Chinese would
never be forgotten. Despite this history, recently, things changed swiftly. Economic reform
in China has made its GDP grow four times in the past decade. At the same time a lot of
experts predict that China will be the number one economic body in next century.
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Facing this situation, Japanese has a problem. As China gets stronger, Japan must
deal with this wakening dragon. Nevertheless, this is not a severe problem since Japanese
are familiar with Chinese strategic thinking. There are just small disputes over human
rights, nuclear tests, and islands between them. The Tienanman Incident disrupted the
financial aid and communication with China, but the smart Japanese soon adjusted their
policy. They are again intimate with China. Now, both countries emphasize their
traditional relations and try to suspend the disputed issues. The reason is that China needs
the financial aid and technology from Japan, and Japan needs resources, and asks China to
support Japan in becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.
Japan also has a dilemma over adopting an advanced or a conservative policy with
regard to her potential threat from big brother China. In October 1996 Japan decided to
give the financial aid to China. This proves that Japan may adopt an advanced policy
toward China. Besides the economic relationship Japan is concerned about the
modernization of the PLA as well. In July 1996 the deputy defense minister visited China
trying to rebuild the communications bridge between both countries. Although Japan is
much concerned about the military modernization of China, under the strategy of "Better
be a friend than an enemy" Japan will try to satisfy China's request.
Moreover, the Diaoyus island - from a historical and logical standpoint -
undoubtedly is part of China. The problem was caused by the Japanese "Rightist
Association" which set up a light house that caused large protests from Chinese society.
Especially the protesters from Taiwan and Hong Kong were seriously protesting that the
Japanese government permitted the Rightists to set up the light house on the island. This
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action strongly aroused the pain of Chinese who suffered from Japan's invasion and
suppression. Under the restraint of the Taiwan government the situation didn't become
worse, but both Taiwan and Hong Kong representatives planted the ROC's and CCP's flag
on the island then temporarily ceased the protest.
The motivation of the civilian protesters seems ceaseless in the near future. On the
other hand, China in this case played a dumb role and caused a huge criticism. Under the
CCP's pressure the pro-protest people were supervised. If China suppressed them more,
the pressure will increase. If the Japanese government can't take this issue seriously the
confrontation won't stop. If neither China nor Japan seeks a peaceful environment, the
relationship between both sides at least will maintain the status quo.
2. Japan and United States
In the postwar era Japan has focused on the United States, and the most important
determinant of Japanese international behavior has been its protection by that country. The
degree to which the United States influences not only Japanese foreign policy but also the
current process of reconstituting national identity should not be underestimated. Japan
remains "possessed" by the United States. The United States, with which Japan feels most
comfortable, continues to be a powerful, confident, and responsible United States. In its
current search for international recognition or a more prominent global role, Japan remains
dependent on U.S. ratification (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1991).
Public opinion polls offer a glimpse of Japanese views of the United States. In a
poll conducted in November 1991, 77 percent of the Japanese responded that U.S. -Japan
relations are important; 59 percent responded that they have favorable feelings toward the
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United States, whereas 32 percent do not (Destler and Nacht, 1990/91, pp. 96-97). It
should be noted that not having favorable feelings does not imply dislike. In a poll taken in
January 1992 - at the height ofU.S. negativity toward Japan (economist John Kenneth
Galbraith deemed President Bush's trip to Japan "possibly the most disastrous journey
since the Fourth Crusade") (Johnson, pp. 4) - when specifically asked to name a country
the Japanese dislike, only 6.7 percent named the United States (Jiji, 1992). The United
States is the country liked by far the most and disliked the least. This has been true
throughout the postwar years, with the exception of the Vietnam War period when
Switzerland, a nation with a peaceful image, ranked slightly higher (Sengo, pp. 182-85).
This psychological dependence on the United States is in part a result ofWorld
War II. The disaster of defeat impressed upon the Japanese the inherent ugliness of
international politics. Thus, Tokyo sought to retreat from international politics and found
the United States willing to act as a shield. Throughout the Cold War, the United States
had been for Japan the protector and guide in international politics (Tamamoto, 1993, pp.
39).
The relation between both countries really depended on how best to resist the
Soviet Union's expansion during the Cold War. Rationally, because the Soviet Union has
already gone, the relationship may change, but the facts tell us the relationship between
both countries did not change. It is only because the Unites States strongly supported
Japanese security and also assisted Japanese reconstruction, that Japan could renovate
itself so fast in a short period after her defeat in 1945. The contributions from the United
States were crucial. In particular, in the occupation era the United States shaped Japanese
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defense policy to lead Japan away from the militarism. In Article 9 of the constitution
Japan forever renounced war and only maintains sufficient military capability to protect
her territory.
Under this situation Japan just spends one percent of her GNP on her military
expenditures, and concentrates on her economic construction and development. Recently
United States reduced her troops in Japan but this does not mean the relations between
both sides will go down. Instead the Japanese government has agreed to share the
expenditures and expand the military installations for United States troops. All these
actions prove that the Japanese government identifies the United States' vital role to Japan
not merely on the basis of past cooperative relations but also because of the prospects for
future uncertainty around this Asian area.
Despite this, friction has risen on both sides of the trade equation. On the export
side, Japan has been accused of dumping textiles, semiconductors, computer games,
laptop computer screens and consumer electronic products on the international market at
below domestic marketplace prices. It also is accused of industrial targeting, i.e.,
government promotion of certain products like automobiles, computers and
semiconductors. On the import side, Japan has been accused of protecting domestic
markets: formal and informal barriers keep foreign products out of the Japanese market.
Beef, rice, citrus, lumber and telecommunications satellites, construction, insurance and
financial products are some of the products and sectors still under partial protection. Yet
under intensive negotiations between Japan and the U.S., many tariff barriers have been
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removed and Japan's market is opening to the world, but the trade disputes still exist
(Mourdoukoutas, 1993, pp. 126).
Table 18 presents a more detailed description of trade between Japan and the
United States from 1960 to 1992. From this table we found before 1964 Japan is a deficit
country, and from 1965 to 1992 (except 1967 and 1975) United States became a deficit
country. Furthermore, obviously, the deficit was getting larger since 1976, and by 1992
the trade deficit was over $40 billion. Seemingly, the trade deficit dispute between both
sides will not settle down in the short run (Nakamura and Vertinsky, 1994, pp. 9).
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Table 18. U.S. Trade with Japan*, 1960-1992 (USSmillion)


































Source: Japanese economic Planning Agency, Summary of Economic Statistics (various years)
* Import figures are based on CIF prices (including the cost of goods, insurance and freight) measured at
Japanese ports. Export figures are based on FOB (free-on-board) prices (including the costs of goods and
delivery onto a carrier) at the point of shipment.
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D. SEEKING A NEW ROLE
The end of Cold War affected Japanese policy tremendously. As the Soviet
military threat declined, Japan reduced its budget for arms procurement and delayed
procurement programs, although its overall defense budget increased at the rate 3.5
percent or so due to higher personnel costs. Increasingly active on the diplomatic scene,
Japan also launched a national debate on what role Japan should play internationally.
Japan's current search for a larger global political role is not a new phenomenon. In
1983, for instance, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone attempted to increase the Japanese
role in international security by taking a stand in support of the United States' deployment
of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe to balance the Soviet SS-20 missiles that
year. The end of the Cold War, however, further stimulated Tokyo to expand its role in
international security issues. In this regard, the government expresses its aspiration to
become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and involved in the
international issues. Since the GulfWar Japan has moved to share risks with other
like-minded nations, such as allowing its Self-Defense Forces to serve overseas under
U.N. peace keeping operations. If all those expectations come true, what will be the next
goal of the Japanese? Will Japan be merely an economic power or just as Japanese said,
will they make more contributions to the world affairs? Is that a hint to become a
superpower?
1. U. N. Security Council
Undoubtedly, Japan should play a vital role in world affairs based on her successful
economy. Specifically, it should complete the first steps to join the U.N. PKO. The next
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step is going further to become a permanent member ofthe U.N. Security Council. In
Japan's Defense Report, page 19, "Reform of the U.N. Security Council", Tokyo also
depicted its intention to become a member. Most countries believe that if Japan becomes a
member of the U.N. Security Council, it will make a large contribution to the international
society. But the obstacles still exist. This also challenges Japan in persuading her big
neighbors, Russia and China, in achieving the goal while assuaging the Asian Countries'
anxiety.
The Japanese view toward the number of permanent and non-permanent members
of the United Nation Security Council has not changed since the nonpermanent member
states were expanded in 1965. Although the international situation has changed greatly in
the wake of the end of the Cold War and the number of permanent U.N. members has
increased to as many as 185, or more than three times the figure at the time of its
founding, the number of nonpermanent members has increased to only 10 from six, and
made the U.N. lopsided toward Europe.
Under such circumstances, member countries have been discussing the need to
review the composition of the Security Council. In 1992, the General Assembly reviewed
the situation and agreed to expand the numbers to achieve a balance of regional
distribution. Though the proposal is still working, Japan will get a chance to become a
permanent member to increase her political influence to equal her economic influence.
Japan may play a vital role in world affairs. If this becomes true in the future, Japan will
switch her defense strategy dramatically because the Japanese view of the constitution will
become flexible.
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If Japan wants to be a big player in world affairs, Japan should not just focus on
the economy. There are many things Japan should resolve: (1) concede the atrocious
behavior, such as the Comfort Woman issue and slaughter of Asian people, (2) apologize
for her mistakes and promise to obey the Japanese constitution, and (3) record the history
clearly and educate her people in an attempt not to make the same mistakes. If Japan can
concede its mistakes, then frankly it should be a real world leader. Otherwise the intention
will be to just "count the chickens before they are hatched". Even if she becomes a U.N.
Security Council member, Japan will not win the respect from Asian people or increase its
influence in that region .
2. U.N.-PKO
The Persian GulfWar gave Japan a very good chance to join the United Nations'
affairs in April 1991 under support by the United States. The taboo which prohibited the
Self-Defense Forces from engaging in dangerous missions was lifted in June 1992.
Therefore, U.N. peace-keeping operations are being conducted in 16 activities with
Japanese participation.
Traditionally, U.N. peace-keeping operations are roughly divided into three
categories: (1) Peace-keeping forces, (2) Cease-fire observer missions, (3) Election
monitoring and other activities. Japan participated in the activities based on the "Law
Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other
operations" and the"Law to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan
Disaster Relief Teams". They provided a statutory framework for Japan to address the
task of pursuing activities for international contribution with human resources (Defense of
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Japan, 1995, pp. 98). Though Japan participated in U.N. affairs with the support ofthe
United States and the other advanced countries, it aroused suspicions from Asian
countries. However, this has a significant impact on Japan's future security role.
It is impossible to stop one of the richest countries from participating in world
affairs. After the economic miracle, Japan has become the number one economic body in
Asia, especially since the 1990's when she increased her relations with Asian countries.
That can help Japan not only in the economic field, but also to get the support from those
so called "Flying-Geese" countries in the political field. Japan is also a vital member of
some crucial international organizations. In June 1992, after a long and difficult
deliberative process, the Japanese Diet enacted a United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
Law. The legislation allowed the government to dispatch Self-Defense Forces abroad as
part ofU.N. peacekeeping if they do not engage in combat operations. Besides this
contribution to U.N. security activities, Japan has also become the second largest donor to
the United Nations after the United States. This is a pattern that pushed Japanese forward,
gradually engaging in world affairs.
3. Merely An Economic Power or A Superpower?
Based on her successful economic strategies in the late seventies, Japan reemerged
on the world's economic platform. And in the eighties, her economic capability almost can
compete with the United States. To some extent, it is even better than the United States,
due to the possession of capital and high technology. Japan, in the economic field, nearly
dominated the markets and competition in the world. In particular, in recent years with the
end of Cold War and potential problems with U.S. -Japan relations, economic trends make
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Japan look more carefully at Asia. For geopolitical reasons Japan has shifted her policy
closer to Asia, the most economically booming area.
During the Cold War period, Japan's manufacturing foreign direct investment
(FDI) emphasized North America 52.0%, Europe 13.7%, and East Asia 19.6%.
However, with the end of the cold war, Japan's manufacturing FDI to North America
dropped to 37.2%, in Europe it was 18.3%, and the portion for East Asia rose to 32.2%.
Looking to the future, East Asia is likely to surpass North America as the foremost
geographic target for FDI manufacturing, since Japanese firms have found investment in
Asia to be much more profitable than in the United States. This shift also shows the
Japanese economic impetus on the world economy.
No doubt, Japan is an Asia-pacific power. The Flying-Geese model of regional
development distinguishes three sets of economies that can be ordered according to their
levels of economic modernization. They are: (1) the East Asian newly industrializing
economies or NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), (2) the four
leading ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), and (3) the
reformist communist states of China and Vietnam (Mochizuki, 1995, pp. 127).
From this point ofview Japan is absolutely a leader in the Asia-Pacific. Depending
on her strong economic capability Japan can turn into a super power. Being objective,
Japan possesses this condition and ability. Nevertheless, based on her record and her bad
reputation, there is no country that will be her follower. Moreover, the attitude of China,
Russia (particularly in resolving territorial disputes with those two countries), the United
States, or the other G-8 countries are also important factors.
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A workshop was held at the East-West Center in Honolulu in 1992. The South
Korean participants perceived the Japanese threat as more immediate than any others. On
the contrary, the Japanese participants believed that Japan is not and could not easily
become a threat to the region. The Japanese constitution (Article 9) prohibits the
remilitarization of Japan or the use of Japanese forces for anything other than self-defense,
so it is obvious that "there are two sides to every question." To different people they have
different views. Actually, as the Japanese participants said, the requirements for amending
the constitution make any changes to these provisions politically unlikely in the foreseeable
future. Much of Japan's quantitatively large military spending goes to burden sharing and
expensive systems that do not provide Japan with capabilities much beyond its home land.
On the other hand, Japan perceives few threats in the region so there is little need for it to
militarize (Kreisberg, Chiu, and Kahan, pp. 13).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In a retrospective on postwar Japanese economic development for more than 50
years, its performance may not score perfect, but its achievements absolutely are second to
none. Some may say that the Japanese are opportunists, however only "intelligence can
consist in recognizing opportunity." This is the bottom line on which the Japanese can
outpace the other advanced countries.
"Ifyou standing upright, don't worry if your shadow is crooked," is a wise saying.
Since Japan set up a strong foundation for its industry, the future development is
optimistic and promising. Nevertheless, a successful outcome is based on numberless
conditions. However, to Japan those conditions were paved with its intentions. The small
obstacles won't impede its progress toward future development.
The development of Japan, like that of many other countries, has been determined
by the operation of internal and external forces working within the setting of its peculiar
environment. The basic constants in Japanese history are readily found in the country's
insularity and limited resources, the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of its people, and the
characteristic values and attitudes that have developed over at least a millennium and a
half.
In tracing modern Japan's combined luck and diligent development, it is just more
than a century that the Japanese have been able to play a critical role in world affairs. This
is based on its successful reforms. On the other hand, it possessed a domestically' stable
environment. This situation is like the Chinese strategist Sun Tze said: Given a knowledge
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of three things - the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven, and the natural advantage of
earth - victory will invariably crown your battle.
The reform and reconstruction during the occupation period permit us to say that
the United States set up the foundation for Japan's future development. Those symptoms
of the war like unemployment, food and energy shortages, inflation and so on were placed
under control by the occupation authority's assistance. Meanwhile the United States also
took an active role to encourage the Japanese to adopt a series of reforms on the Zaibatsu,
land, and labor issues. To shape the Japanese economic democratization, in terms of
today's viewpoint, those reforms may be described as a keystone for the coming decades'
economic success.
On the basis of successful reforms, from 1953 to 1973 the annual real growth rate
of Japan's gross national product (GNP) averaged 10 percent, probably the highest
sustained rate of increase that the world has ever seen. Furthermore, the industrialization
and modernization that made rapid growth can be traced back to a high literacy rate,
advanced technology, and sufficient capital which came from the United States' special
procurement due to the Korean War. This rapid economic growth also produced swifter
changes in Japan's economy and society.
After the rapid economic growth, owing to worldwide inflation the rapid growth
collapsed at the beginning of 1974. Besides the abandonment of the 360-yen-to-the-dollar
exchange rate which had been maintained since 1 949, and resource limitations as
symbolized by the oil crisis of 1973, Japan departed from the path of rapid growth and
began to follow a course of so called "stable" growth. Although the growth kept stable
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since the first half of the 1980s, it didn't mean that Japan would go smoothly in the future.
As a matter of fact, Japan faced a lot of problems from internal and external fields. Its
external problem emerged with the U.S. trade deficit, and the emergence of regionalism of
the European and North America countries. Internally, in recent years the yen's
appreciation caused industry to lose its competitive domination and it moved out to the
foreign countries. At the same time because of the bubble of real estate prices, the
construction and financial sectors also needed to take some actions to solve those
problems. Therefore the Japanese should apply their supremacy and improve their
weaknesses to increase their competitive capability.
Particularly, at the end of the Cold War the world gradually formed a unipolar
political world. This will make Japan continue to be an important ally of the United States.
Furthermore, an open, interdependent global economy Japan will have vastly different
implications for Japan's society than a tripolar regionalized world in which economic
competition becomes the conductor of war by other means. The ways in which Japan uses
its power will significantly affect the resolution of these issues (Gilpin, 1993, pp.35).
Although it will be extraordinarily difficult for Japan to assume a greater global
leadership role, it has the power and perhaps even the obligation to make a positive impact
on the course of history as these issues are resolved. Failure to assume greater leadership
in the effort to maintain an open world economy threatens the triumph of a regionalized
world economy. Japan, then, is a major actor at the same time that it is acted upon. It is no
longer possible for Japan to view the debate reviewed here as a concerned, albeit
nonengaged, spectator. Japan's policies, like those of the other powers, will crucially shape
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the political and economic framework within which future Japanese leaders will identify
and pursue Japan's national interests (Gilpin, 1993, pp.35).
China emerged as a vital player since in the past fifteen years it has had the highest
economic growth in the world. From the vantage point of Japanese political and economic
concerns, China, Japan, and United States are the key players shaping integrative
economic developments and divisive territorial conflicts. Japanese also sees the need for a
cooperative U.S.-Japan relationship to underpin stability in the Pacific region. Recently,
the expansion of Japan-U.S. security arrangements also caused China concern. This
tendency will lead to positive or negative developments still under observation.
The ceasing ofthe Cold War did not bring real peace to world affairs. Religious
confrontations, ethnic tensions, and border disputes persist. Therefore, Japan can be
expected to help manage these conflicts in a variety of ways. Japan can pursue diplomatic
efforts - bilateral or multilateral - to prevent armed conflict, ease tensions or secure
peaceful settlement of armed conflict. Actually, Japan has been playing this role through
the peacekeeping forces to make its contributions, but from a Japanese perspective they
might make more contributions if they become a permanent member of the UN Security
Council. This might come true in the near future with the support of Russia and China
(this hypothesis excludes the veto right). If this hypothesis becomes real, the Japanese
economic giant probably will become another superpower in the next century. We might
find some clues from the post-Cold War Japanese policies.
In sum, postwar Japanese economic development during the occupation period
(1947-1952), under the assistance of the United States, carried out a series of reforms.
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Based on those reforms, the Japanese economy recovered from the war's ashes, and
proceeded toward the high growth era (1954-1973). Japan became the highest growth
country and elevated itself to be an advanced country.
After 1974 due to its internal and external problems, the Japanese economy
entered a slower growth period. However, the economic performance of Japan generally is
still higher than those of the other advanced countries. Based on an evaluation of its
economic strengths and weaknesses, the Japanese economy still retains a lot of
supremacies. On the basis of its economic power, during the post-Cold War era Japan may
become a vital player economically or politically. This is a trend. However, it is also a big
challenge to the Japanese in shaping their policies to regional or international issues.
Simultaneously, as Japan copes with that challenge it must also protect its interests.
As Japan adapts to the post-Cold War era, this process will have consequences for
its Asian neighbors that will be as important as the economic successes which made Japan
a major power once more. Therefore, it is important for those Asian neighbors to pay
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